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Employee Handbooks and the Legal
Effect of Disclaimers
Stephen F. Befortt
In his article, Professor Befort discusses the use of employee handbook
disclaimers in the workplace. He begins the article with an examination of
the employment-at-will rule, its history, and exceptions which recently have
been utilized by courts that refuse to apply the rule under certain condi-
tions. He then turns to the use of handbook disclaimers and explores the
varying contexts in which courts agree or decline to enforce them. Finally,
Professor Befort offers a somewhat different approach which takes into ac-
count both the benefits employers derive from the use of handbooks and
the reasonable expectations they instill in employees.
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INTRODUCTION
The decline in strict enforcement of the employment-at-will rule was
widely acclaimed as the most important development in employment law
during the 1980's.1 Courts and legislative bodies alike created exceptions
in response to the perceived harshness of a rule that permitted employers
to discharge their employees regardless of rationale or length of service.
One of the most commonly accepted limitations on the at-will rule is
the implied contract exception; the employee handbook is a notable ex-
ample. These handbooks, which detail an employer's personnel rules and
expectations, are more than mere gratuities. Employers distribute them
in order to obtain certain benefits in the context of an ongoing employ-
1. See eg., Kurt H. Decker, Handbooks and Employment Policies as Express or Implied
Guarantees of Employment-Employer Bewarel, 5 J.L. & CoM. 207, 208 n.3 (1985); Kenneth T.
Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law
Issue of the 80"s, 40 Bus. LAw. 1, 1 (1984).
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ment relationship. The handbooks also may create legitimate expecta-
tions among the workforce. Accordingly, courts in the vast majority of
jurisdictions now recognize that, in appropriate circumstances, an em-
ployer's promise of job security in a handbook is a legally enforceable
obligation.2 A number of the courts, however, also have suggested that
employers could avoid unwanted contractual liability by using
disclaimers.
3
Not surprisingly, a virtual industry has arisen devoted to designing
enforceable handbook disclaimers. Its goal is to enable employers to re-
tain benefits flowing from the use of employee manuals without incurring
attendant legal obligations. If successful, this effort would accomplish a
de facto elimination of the handbook exception to the at-will rule.
A review of handbook cases over the past decade reveals a signifi-
cant gap between theory and practice with respect to the legal effect of
disclaimers. In theory, the courts suggest, disclaimers can dispel em-
ployee expectations and negate the contractual nature of employee hand-
books.4 In practice, however, many courts have gone to great lengths to
avoid giving dispositive effect to disclaimers. In at least forty-five re-
ported decisions since 1980, courts have rejected employer attempts to
defeat handbook claims by asserting the preclusive effect of disclaimers.5
The common denominator in these cases is a reluctance to allow a boiler-
plate disclaimer to shield handbook promises from enforcement without
a prior examination of the overall circumstances and equities of the
situation.6
This article explores this gap between theory and practice with re-
spect to the legal status of disclaimers. Part I discusses the emergence of
the handbook exception to the employment-at-will rule.7 Part II surveys
the law of handbook disclaimers in both theory and practice.' Part III
analyzes the gulf that has emerged between theory and practice. 9 In the
concluding portion, I recommend closing the gap by adjusting the theo-
retical side of the equation to reflect both the benefits an employer de-
rives from a handbook and the legitimate employee expectations that
handbook language may create despite the inclusion of a disclaimer. °
On the practical side, I urge that courts resist construing disclaimers as
automatically precluding enforcement of handbook statements. Instead,
the disclaimer should be just one of the factors for the trier of fact to
2. See discussion infra part I.B.
3. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
5. These decisions are listed in the appendix. See infra pp. 382-85.
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra part I.B.
8. See discussion infra part II.
9. See discussion infra part III.A-B.
10. See discussion infra part III.C-D.
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS
consider in determining whether an employee handbook, when viewed in
its entirety, conveys a credible promise that the law should enforce.
I.
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS AND THE RULE OF EMPLOYMENT
AT WILL
A. The Rise and Fall of Employment At Will
The at-will rule has prevailed in employment law for at least the last
century.11 The rule generally is traced to treatise writer Horace Gray
Wood, who wrote the following in 1877:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at-will, and if the servant seeks to make out a yearly hiring,
the burden is upon him to establish it by proof.... [l]t is an indefinite
hiring and is determinable at the will of either party.' 2
Although the accuracy of Wood's description of the law at that time
is questionable, 3 "Wood's rule" quickly became the law throughout the
United States.14 Only a few years later, for example, the Tennessee
Supreme Court articulated its classic formulation of the rule: "All may
dismiss their employees at-will, be they many or few, for good cause, for
no cause or even for a cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty
of legal wrong." 15
The employment-at-will doctrine is premised on a theoretical equal-
ity of rights. Both employer and employee have the right to terminate
the employment relationship at any time and for any reason. This theo-
retical equality is consistent with prevailing late 19th-century notions of
freedom of contract and unfettered entrepreneurship.' 6 As a doctrine
11. For a good description of the development and historical antecedents of the employment-
at-will rule, see generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20
AM. ". LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).
12. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
13. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Ariz. 1985) ("As
commentators and courts later would point out, none of the four cases cited by Wood actually
supported the rule."); see also Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 886-87
(Mich. 1980) (noting that juries in those cases were permitted to determine questions of fact based on
"written or oral communications between the parties"); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Secur-
ity, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341-42 (1974) [hereinafter Note, Implied Contract Rights]. Apparently,
some American courts continued to follow the one-year presumption as to duration, which had been
borrowed from the English common law. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816, 1825 n.51 (1980)
(hereinafter Note, Protecting At Will Employees] (citing CHARLES MANLEY SMITH, TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 53-57 (1852)).
14. See Feinman, supra note 11, at 121.
15. Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds by
Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915).
16. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 13, at 1824-26 ("By increasing the
employer's freedom in the employment relationship and restricting her liability, the at-will contract
rule was meant to further economic growth and entrepreneurship."); see also Richard J. Pratt, Corn-
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regulated by market rather than legal forces, the at-will rule has been
defended on the basis that it promotes overall economic efficiency with a
minimum of administrative cost. 17
Today, however, the rule's detractors are numerous: many commen-
tators have written about the unfairness of the at-will rule;18 and its theo-
retical underlying equality is widely viewed as fictional in reality. 9 The
greater concentration of economic resources on the employer's side ren-
ders the loss of an individual worker to a typical employer much less
severe than the loss of a sustaining income to a typical employee. Courts
and commentators alike point to a changing economy, characterized by
large corporate employers and specialized job functions, as further exac-
erbating this imbalance.2 0
Two additional factors compound the increasing discomfort with
the at-will rule. First, the at-will rule may be out of step with contempo-
rary employee expectations. As Professor Finkin's work illustrates, em-
ployers have been successful over the past century in efforts to reduce
employee turnover. This phenomenon, in turn, produces heightened em-
ment, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachments on the Employ-
ment-At-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 201 ("Mhe at-will doctrine contributed to the
entrepreneurship and economic growth of an era.").
17. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 947
(1984); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Effi-
ciency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989); see also Jeffrey L. Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at-Will
Employment Contract" An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IowA L. REv. 327 (1984) (con-
cluding that the adoption of limitations on the at-will rule will impose increased economic costs on
employees, particularly those with low skills and few alternative employment opportunities). On the
other hand, some commentators claim that the at-will rule is economically inefficient because of the
costs associated with employee turnover. See, eg., Pratt, supra note 16, at 202; Note, Protecting At
Will Employees, supra note 13, at 1833-34.
18. See, eg., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967); Joseph DeGiuseppe,
Jr., The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Bene-
fits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 69-70 (1981); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against
Unjust Dismissal. Timefor a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 482-84 (1976); Richard A. Winters, Note,
Employee Handbooks and Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 DuKE L.J. 196, 198-99.
19. One commentator has noted the following:
[I]n principle there is widespread agreement that the employment-at-will doctrine has no
economic or moral justification in a modem industrialized Nation. The idea that there is
equity in a rule under which the individual employee and the employer have the same right
to terminate an employment relationship at will is obviously fictional in a society in which
most workers are dependent upon employers for their livelihood.
Jack Steiber, Most U.S. Workers Still May be Fired Under the Employment-at-Will Doctrine,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1984, at 34, 36.
20. See, eg., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (ll. 1981) (citing
Blades, supra note 18, at 1405: "With the rise of large corporations conducting specialized opera-
tions and employing relatively immobile workers who often have no other place to market their
skills, recognition that the employer and employee do not stand on equal footing is realistic.");
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509-10 (N.J. 1980) (tracing the rule's history
from widespread acceptance to disfavor among commentators and courts); Blades, supra note 18, at
1404-05; Pratt, supra note 16, at 200-01.
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS
ployee expectations in job tenure.2 1 Second, the at-will rule is becoming
a global anomaly; the United States virtually stands alone among indus-
trialized nations in failing to provide general statutory protection against
unjust dismissals.22
The continued decline in unionization further exacerbates the harsh-
ness of the at-will rule. Passage of the National Labor Relations Act in
1935,23 itself a response to the recognized inequality of bargaining power
between labor and management, 24 marked the first major inroad against
the at-will rule. The Act adjusts relative bargaining strength by requir-
ing management to bargain in good faith with its employees' collective
representative.25 Some ninety-four percent of the resulting agreements
contain a "just cause" limitation on employee discipline.26 Unionization,
then, offers an alternative to at-will employment that employees may se-
lect by majority vote.27
However, the American union movement has faltered. The propor-
tion of unionized employees in the non-agricultural work force has de-
clined from over thirty percent in 1960 to about sixteen percent in
1990.2' As the alternative of collective bargaining becomes less viable,
the at-will doctrine becomes more intolerable. Ironically, to the extent
that American employers' opposition to unionization reflected their in-
21. Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work Employer Policies and Contract Law,
1986 Wis. L. REv. 733, 751-52 (1986). Much of Professor Finkin's analysis builds on the conclu-
sions reached in SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AmERXcAN INDUSTRY, 1900-1945 (1985).
22. See Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissals in Other Countrie" Some Cautionary Notes, 10
EMPLOYMENT REL. L.J. 286, 287 (1984); Summers, supra note 18, at 508-09.
23. The National Labor Relations Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988) [hereinafter
the NLRA or the Act]. The original version, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), is better known as the Wagner
Act.
24. The "Findings and Policies" section of the National Labor Relations Act expressly en-
dorses the policy of "restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees."
Wagner Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151. The Supreme Court, in upholding the Wagner Act against consti-
tutional challenge, similarly explained the guiding congressional purpose:
Long ago we stated the reasons for labor organizations. We said that they were organized
out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an
employer.., that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality
with their employer.... Fully recognizing the legality of collective action on the part of
employees in order to safeguard their proper interests, we said that Congress was not re-
quired to ignore this right but could safeguard it.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937).
25. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
26. Roger 1. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Disci-
pline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 594 n.1.
27. Representation and voting procedures are governed by § 9 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159.
28. See Katherine van Wezel Stone, The Legacy ofIndustrial Pluralism: The Tension Between
Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. Cm. L. REv.
575, 578 (1992); 139 LAB. REi. REP. (BNA) 182 (1992) (U.S. Department of Labor reporting 1991
union membership at 16.1 percent of wage and salary work force).
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terest in preserving the at-will prerogative, they unwittingly may have
contributed to the demise of the rule itself.
Statutory limitations on the at-will doctrine appeared first. In addi-
tion to the NLRA, anti-discrimination statutes were passed at both the
federal and state levels beginning with the enactment of Title VII in
1964.29 These statutes ban employee discharges that discriminate on the
basis of specified "protected" criteria, such as race and gender. The list
of protected classifications has grown over the years to include age30 and
disability3l as well.
Judge-made exceptions to the at-will rule are a recent phenomenon.
Only a handful of cases predate 1980. With varying degrees of accept-
ance, three major exceptions have emerged.32
The most widely accepted exception is grounded in tort law. Ap-
proximately forty jurisdictions33 now recognize that an at-will agree-
ment, like any other contract, should not be enforced if enforcement
would offend public policy. 34 In an early decision, for example, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that public policy prohibited an employer
from terminating an employee who refused to commit an unlawful act.35
In addition, the courts frequently have cited public policy reasons to bar
discharges of employees who exercise statutory rights36 or who report an
29. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). For an example of a
state anti-discrimination statute, see MiNN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.15 (1990 and Supp. 1991).
30. See the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 &
Supp. I 1989 & Supp. 11 1990).
31. See the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. II 1990).
32. See infra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
33. Recent surveys attempting to ascertain the number of jurisdictions recognizing these ex-
ceptions are somewhat inconsistent. Professor Summers, writing in 1988, reported 32 states adopt-
ing some form of the public policy exception, 29 states implying contractual obligations from
employee handbooks, and 11 states endorsing the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Clyde
W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REv. 7, 13-14
(1988). A survey published by Michael Chagares the following year found generally higher totals:
43 states recognizing a public policy exception, 41 states recognizing an implied contract exception,
but only nine states adopting a good faith and fair dealing covenant. Michael A. Chagares, Utiliza-
tion of the Disclaimer as an Effective Means to Define the Employment Relationship, 17 HoFSTRA L.
REv. 365, 400-05 (1989). One explanation for the higher totals in the Chagares survey may be his
inclusion of federal cases which construe state law. Id at 400.
34. See, eg., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948) (discussing the commonly accepted
rule denying enforcement to an agreement that is contrary to either law or public policy).
35. The employee in this case refused to participate in an unlawful price-fixing scheme.
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980); see also Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref.
Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) (refusal to violate antipollution laws by dispensing leaded gas
into car designed for unleaded gas); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d 149 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1978) (refusal to perform medical procedure without license); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687
S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (refusal to violate antipollution laws by pumping boat bilges into water).
36. See, eg., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (reversing
summary judgment for employer on grounds that discharge for refusal to take polygraph test, in
contravention of state statute, may give rise to cause of action); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d
353 (Il. 1978) (affirming award to employee discharged for filing workers' compensation claim).
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employer's unlawful conduct.3 7 The public policy exception, then, fo-
cuses on the employer's reason for terminating an employee and provides
the employee a cause of action when that rationale violates recognized
public policy mandates. 38
Most states also recognize a contract-based exception to the at-will
employment rule.39 Following this approach, courts imply contractual
obligations, such as some form of job security or disciplinary procedure,
from promissory expressions communicated by the employer. These ex-
pressions may take the form of oral statements,' pre-employment let-
ters,41 employee handbooks,42 or a combination of circumstances
including past personnel practices and longevity of service.4 3 Under this
exception, courts generally focus on the legitimacy of employee expecta-
tions rather than on the employer's alleged misdeeds.
A few jurisdictions" recognize a third exception rooted in both tort
and contract law.45 Borrowing from the field of commercial transac-
37. See, eg., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (employee
discharged for reporting labeling misrepresentations to employer); Palmateer v. International Har-
vester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (I. 1981) (employee discharged for reporting criminal conduct to au-
thorities). A number of jurisdictions have enacted statutes specifically prohibiting employee
discharges for such "whistleblowing" activities. Se eg., The Whistleblower Protection Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (fed-
eral employees); MICH. Comp. LAws §§ 15.361 et seq (1992).
38. Courts typically require that the discharge violate a "clear mandate of public policy." See,
e-g., Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Pierce v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509, 512 (N.J. 1980) (stating that "the sources of public policy
include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions. In certain
instances, a professional code of ethics may [also] contain an expression of public policy.").
39. See articles cited supra note 33.
40. See4 eg., Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983)
(holding representation that employee would not be discharged without cause may be read into
employment contract); Bullock v. Automobile Club, 444 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. 1989) (finding revoca-
tion of oral promise in policy manual not necessarily binding), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072, reh'g
denied, 494 U.S. 1092 (1990).
41. See, eg., Integon Life Ins. Co. v. Vandegrift, 669 S.W.2d 492 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (hold-
ing employer to pre-employment letter terms, though they contradicted subsequent contract
provisions).
42. See discussion infra part I.B.
43. See4 eg., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981) (granting implied
promise of fair treatment as reward for loyalty).
44. See supra note 33.
45. This third exception commonly is referred to as 'breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.' See, eg., John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions
Based upon Contract Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565,
1634-37 (1986). Most jurisdictions that recognize the covenant of good faith and fair dealing author-
ize only contract damages rather than potentially more lucrative tort damages. See, eg., Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389-401 (Cal. 1988) (finding that contract remedies are the
most appropriate means of relief for wrongful termination); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial
Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985); Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 748-49 (Idaho
1987) (following the Foley and Wagenseller approach). But see K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d
1364, 1370-73 (Nev. 1987) (extending tort liability for breach of employment contracts by comparing
them to insurance contracts).
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tions,4 these states read a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the
employment agreement. This covenant requires that parties to a contract
refrain from acting in bad faith to frustrate one another's expectations of
receiving the benefits of their bargains.' Often cited as an example of
this approach is Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,48 in which the
Massachusetts Supreme Court found a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing where an employer terminated a salesman to avoid
paying anticipated sales commissions. Most jurisdictions have declined
to adopt the covenant limitation on the at-will rule,49 and at least one
state court has rejected the bad faith concept as too "amorphous." 50
Partly in response to the proliferation of exceptions to the at-will
rule, the Uniform Law Commissioners recently approved the Model Em-
ployment Termination Act.5 The Act would require "just cause" in or-
der to discharge virtually all employees unless the statutory protection
was waived by an individually executed agreement that provided for
fixed minimum amounts of severance pay graduated by length of ser-
vice. 2 The trade-off that the Act offers employers is the elimination of
most common law claims,53 a ban on punitive damages,5" and the finan-
cial advantages of an extrajudicial forum.5" While the Model Act may
foreshadow the eventual future of employee termination law, to date only
one state has enacted legislation even remotely resembling it.56
B. The Employee Handbook Exception to the At-Will Rule
Employee handbooks are a common source of an implied contract
right to job security.5 7 The transformation of employee handbooks from
gratuitous expressions of employer policy to enforceable legal obligations
46. See, eg., U.C.C. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty within the Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
47. See, eg., Mitford v. De Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983) (finding against employer who
discharged employee in effort to avoid profit sharing liability); Fortune v. National Cash Register
Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (holding in favor of salesman fired by employer attempting to
avoid bonus payments); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987) (holding against
employer who dismissed employee in effort to avoid retirement benefit payments).
48. 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1254 (Mass. 1977).
49. See articles cited supra note 33.
50. See, eg., Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 629 (Haw. 1982) (rejecting the
covenant because it would necessitate "judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of bad
faith").
51. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMNATION AcT (1991).
52. Id §§ 3, 4.
53. Id § 2(b), (d).
54. Id. § 7(d).
55. See id. §§ 5-8 (providing for enforcement by means of an arbitral forum); Appendix Alter-
native A (providing an alternative enforcement system by means of an administrative agency forum).
56. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1991). The statute prohibits employers from
discharging employees without "good cause," or in violation of either public policy or express provi-
sions of the employer's own written personnel policy.
57. See Chagares, supra note 33, at 373 n. 69.
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provides a vivid illustration of the declining adherence to the employ-
ment-at-will rule.
Employee handbooks, or personnel manuals as they sometimes are
called, vary significantly in shape and content. The spectrum extends
from short, fluffy welcoming statements to lengthy documents containing
far more detail than the average collective bargaining agreement."8 Their
primary function is to convey information concerning the employer's
personnel policies. 9 The handbooks typically include rules concerning
expected employee behavior, disciplinary procedures, and compensation
schedules, as well as information on fringe benefits such as sick leave and
vacation. 6°
1. Traditional Objections to Handbook Enforcement
Under traditional at-will employment analysis, courts routinely con-
strue employee handbooks as lacking contractual status.6' In part, this
lack of enforceability is the same as for any employment arrangement
that lacks a specified duration. Under the at-will rule, the courts pre-
sume that a contract of indefinite duration is terminable at the option of
either party.62 The parties are, of course, free to stipulate to a contract
for a designated period. 63 But under traditional contract doctrine, a pur-
ported limitation on the employer's right to discharge an employee hired
without a specified duration, such as an agreement to terminate only for
cause or subject to progressive discipline, is enforceable only if the em-
58. See, ag., Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1989) (em-
ployee manual at issue encompassed "85 pages of detailed text."). One commentator has described
employee handbooks as the "equivalent of the union contract in the nonunion setting." John D.
Coombe, Employee HandbookL- Asset or Liability, 12 EMPLOYMENT REL. L.J. 4, 12 (1986).
59. For a discussion of the purposes and functions of employee handbooks, see Coombe, supra
note 58, at 10-13.
60. See Decker, supra note 1, at 211.
61. See eg., Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (finding no binding
promise of continued employment even if handbook was part of employee's contract); Johnson v.
National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976) (holding company policy manual providing
that no employee be fired absent just cause did not express or imply a contract); Cederstrand v.
Lutheran Bhd., 117 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. 1962) (finding absence of consideration rendered manual's
just-cause provision unenforceable); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982)
(holding unenforceable handbook provision requiring notice of termination, where handbook was
distributed two years after employee's hire); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 299 N.W.2d 147 (Neb.
1980) (citing Johnson for proposition that company policy manuals do not constitute contracts with-
out a promise for a definite term of employment); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 425 N.Y.S.2d 327
(App. Div.) (declining to find creation of employment obligation where manual relied on could have
been unilaterally amended or withdrawn), appeal dismissed, 414 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y. 1980).
62. See Feinman, supra note 11, at 125; Comment, Employment at Will and the Law of Con-
tracts, 23 BuFF. L. REv. 211, 215 (1973).
63. See, eg., Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, 663 P.2d 958, 959 (Alaska 1983)
(holding contract for employment until retirement to be for a definite period and therefore termina-
ble only for good cause).
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ployee provides additional consideration."4 The employee's promise to
provide services for the employer is insufficient to support such a limita-
tion because the employee already is obligated to provide these services
in exchange for a paycheck. Moreover, enforcing this limitation would
offend the requirement of mutuality of obligation, since the employee still
would be free to quit at any time.66 Thus, unless the employee provides
some consideration beyond that inherent in the employment relationship,
such as the sale of a business67 or forgoing an injury claim,68 an em-
ployer's promise of job security for an indefinite period is unenforceable.
Moreover, employee handbooks suffer from an even more funda-
mental impediment under traditional at-will analysis. Until recently, the
courts viewed handbook statements not as contractual in nature, but in-
stead as mere unilateral expressions of employer policy. 69 In Johnson v.
National Beef Packing Co.,7 for example, an employee attempted to
challenge his dismissal by relying on the employer's promise in a com-
pany manual that "[n]o employee shall be dismissed without just
cause."71 Refusing to afford any contractual status to this language, the
Kansas Supreme Court summarized the usual objection as follows:
It [the employee handbook] was only a unilateral expression of company
policy and procedures. Its terms were not bargained for by the parties
and any benefits conferred by it were mere gratuities. Certainly, no meet-
ing of the minds was evidenced by the defendant's unilateral act of pub-
64. See, eg., Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 117 N.W.2d 213, 222-23 (Minn. 1962); Forrer v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Wis. 1967).
65. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 13, at 351-52; see also Aberman v. Maiden
Mills Indus., 414 N.W.2d 769, 772 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that additional consideration
sufficient to support agreement must be of type that is "uncharacteristic" of the employment
relationship).
66. See, eg., Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 425 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328-29 (App. Div.) (holding that
the handbook "does not create an obligation on the part of the employer to continue the employment
of the employee for life, subject only to the conditions set forth in the manual while leaving the
employee free to terminate his employment at any time and for any or no reason" (citation omit-
ted)), appeal dismissed, 414 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y. 1980); see also Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413
N.E.2d 1054, 1062 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775, 779
(Ind. Ct. App. 1975)); Hanson v. Central Show Printing Co., 130 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Iowa 1964).
67. See, e.g., Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1971); Weidman v.
United Cigar Stores Co., 72 A. 377 (Pa. 1909).
68. See, eg., Rhoades v. Chesapeake & Oil Ry., 39 S.E. 209, 211-12 (W. Va. 1901).
69. See, eg., Caster v. Hennessey, 727 F.2d 1075, 1077 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding handbook not
to be binding where grievance procedures could be exercised at defendant's discretion); Lieber v.
Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear Div., 577 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (holding employer endorse-
ment of policy statement does not create a contractual right to that policy); Heideck v. Kent Gen.
Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982) (finding that no binding contract existed where handbook
was a unilateral expression of the employer's policies issued for the guidance and benefit of the
employees); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont. 1982) (declining to hold
employer to handbook provision where handbook could be changed unilaterally at any time).
70. 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976).
71. Id. at 781.
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lishing company policy. 72
In short, the lack of an express bargain foreclosed the existence of a legal
obligation.
2. Policy Reasons for Enforcing Handbook Provisions
Like most developments in the law, the transition of employee hand-
books from unenforceable statements to binding contracts resulted from
practical concerns rather than from the adoption of a revolutionary legal
theory. The Michigan Supreme Court, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield,73 first recognized that employee handbooks are not mere gratui-
tous expressions. The Toussaint court correctly perceived two key attrib-
utes common to many employee handbooks. First, employers issue
handbooks for the purpose of securing tangible benefits.74 Second, many
of these benefits are secured by encouraging employee reliance on prom-
issory statements contained in the handbooks.7
a. Employer Benefits
The Toussaint court recognized that an employer may seek a
number of different benefits through the distribution of an employee
manual. The court noted, for example, that the adoption of a handbook
can enhance the employment relationship:
The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, and
the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and the con-
viction that he will be treated fairly.76
The benefits that distribution of an employee handbook can produce
for an employer include:
(1) Promoting employee adherence to a desired code of workplace
conduct. Employee handbooks typically attempt to influence employee
behavior by presenting a set of work rules.77 In addition, the handbooks
often foster employee compliance with this code of conduct by including
supplementary statements of encouragement (i.e., suggestions of job se-
curity, promotion, or compensation increases) or discouragement (i.e.,
indications of disciplinary consequences for failure to follow the rules).
72. Id at 782.
73. 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Mich. 1980).
74. Id at 892; see also Jones v. East Ctr. for Community Mental Health, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 969,
974 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) ("Indeed, why would an employer adopt the policies contained in an
employment manual if it did not expect to benefit from them?").
75. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892-95. For a discussion of how employers issue handbooks for
the purpose of obtaining benefits through the development of employee expectations, see THE EM-
PLOYEE HANDBOOK: AN A-Z GUIDE TO COMMUNICATING wrrH EMPLOYEBS 225-26 (Harper
Business Series in Human Resources Management 1990); Coombe, supra note 58, at 10-13; Finkin,
supra note 21, at 747.
76. Finkin, supra note 21, at 892.
77. See Coombe, supra note 58, at 12; Finkin, supra note 21, at 747.
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Presumably, employee compliance will enhance overall discipline and
productivity.78
(2) Implementing a uniform personnel system which is easy to ad-
minister. A uniform set of personnel rules makes both judicial and prac-
tical sense.79 In response to personnel questions, employers can point to
the handbook and thus avoid confronting each issue anew. In addition,
many handbooks describe dispute resolution procedures that help to
channel and defuse potentially troublesome personnel problems.
(3) Avoiding unionization. Some employers distribute handbooks
containing relatively generous personnel rules in order to diminish their
employees' incentives for seeking union representation."0 This helps em-
ployers avoid the limitations on management flexibility which result from
collective bargaining.
(4) Boosting employee morale Handbooks may convey to employ-
ees the impression of a fair and benevolent employer. By creating "an
atmosphere of fair treatment and job security,"8 employers seek to se-
cure a work force that is both more loyal 82 and less transitory. 3 As one
court has stated, employers use handbooks to promote an "environment
conducive to collective productivity. '8 4
(5) Creating a favorable image in the community. A handbook con-
taining "fair" employment policies also may convey a favorable impres-
sion to the community at large."5 Presumably both consumers and
government generally prefer employers who are "good citizens" to those
who are not.
b. Employee Expectations
The Toussaint86 court also recognized that employees legitimately
may develop expectations based on handbook language. The handbook
issued by the employer in Toussaint, for example, was 260 pages long and
78. See THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK, supra note 75, at 225.
79. See eg., In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112,
120 (Mich. 1989) (recognizing that even revocable employment policies promote stable employment
relations by holding employers accountable and by requiring consistent and uniform application); see
generally THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK, supra note 75, at 226.
80. See, eg., Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 724 P.2d 110, 116 (Haw. 1986); Pres-
ton v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, Ltd., 555 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Mobil
Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 706-07 (Wyo. 1985).
81. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash. 1984).
82. See, eg., Kinoshita, 724 P.2d at 117; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892 (Mich. 1980); Jones v. East Ctr. for Community Mental Health, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 969, 974
(Ohio 1984); see also THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK, supra note 75, at 226.
83. See Finkin, supra note 21, at 747.
84. In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112, 119 (Mich.
1989).
85. See Coombe, supra note 58, at 12.
86. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
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contained "elaborate procedures promising" both "fair, consistent, and
reasonable corrective discipline" and discharge "for just cause only.""7
Given the explicit promises, the court concluded that the "employees
could justifiably rely on those expressions and conduct themselves
accordingly.""8
Employee handbooks create a direct correlation between employee
expectations and employer benefits, enabling the employer to generate
the expectations as a means of yielding the benefits. The employer makes
promissory statements in a handbook with the purpose of obtaining a
benefit. Indeed, the more a handbook fosters employee reliance on
promises of job security or specific disciplinary procedures, the more
likely that the employer will derive the benefits for which the handbook
was issued.
The confluence of these two factors-employer benefits and em-
ployee expectations---establishes a firm policy foundation for the enforce-
ment of handbook promises. To the extent that employers secure
benefits by encouraging employee reliance on promises expressed in em-
ployee handbooks, they should not be able to void these promises as gra-
tuitous and unenforceable. In Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme Court
summarized these considerations aptly:
Having announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the
benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved qual-
ity of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as
illusory.8 9
Instead, the employer has "created a situation 'instinct with an
obligation.' "I
3. Doctrinal Bases for Handbook Enforcement
While the policy justifications for enforcing handbook promises are
87. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 893.
88. Id.; see also Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. 1984) ("It
would appear that employers expect, if not demand, that their employees abide by the policies ex-
pressed in such manuals. This may create an atmosphere where employees justifiably rely on the
expressed policies and, thus, justifiably expect that the employers will do the same." (emphasis in
original)).
89. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Mich. 1980); see also
Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984) ("[Ilf an employer does
choose to issue a policy statement, in a manual or otherwise, and, by its language or by the em-
ployer's actions, encourages reliance thereon, the employer cannot be free to only selectively abide
by it."); Woolley v. Hoffm-annLa Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1266 (NJ. 1985) ("Our courts will
not allow an employer to offer attractive inducements and benefits to the workforce and then with-
draw them when it chooses, no matter how sincere its belief that they are not enforceable."); Thomp-
son, 685 P.2d at 1088 ("Once an employer announces a specific policy or practice, especially in light
of the fact that he expects employees to abide by the same, the employer may not treat its promises
as illusory.").
90. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214
(N.Y. 1917)).
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clear, the theoretical underpinnings are less developed. Typical of most
early handbook cases, the Toussaint opinion focused more on issues of
fairness than on theory. In a more recent decision, the Michigan
Supreme Court surveyed the case law and reported that "[w]hile a major-
ity of jurisdictions now recognize some type of 'handbook exception' to
the employment-at-will doctrine, there is no clear consensus as to... the
legal theory supporting the handbook exception."'"
The courts generally rely on either or both of two legal theories to
support the handbook exception: unilateral contract and promissory es-
toppel. The more frequently invoked appears to be the former.92
a Unilateral Contract Theory
Unilateral contract theory is a convenient analytical tool in the
handbook context because it eliminates the need to find an express ex-
change of promises as a prerequisite to enforceability.93 As discussed
above,94 the lack of an explicit bargain initially was a major stumbling
block to the enforcement of handbook promises. Mutual assent is neces-
sary to the formation of the typical bilateral contract under traditional
contract law principles." A unilateral contract, however, does not re-
quire a mutual exchange of promises.96 Instead, such a contract is
formed when a party responds to a promissory offer by commencing per-
formance of the desired task, without the necessity of a prior or even an
accompanying express reciprocal promise of performance.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Pine River State Bank
v. Mettille97 illustrates the unilateral contract approach. In that case, the
bank distributed a handbook describing disciplinary procedures applica-
ble to all its employees.9" Subsequently, on discovering that one of its
loan officers had made a number of deficient loan arrangements, the bank
fired the employee without following the handbook procedures.99 In
spite of the absence of any express exchange of promises or specified du-
ration of employment, the court held that the employer was bound to
comply with the disciplinary procedures it had established under a uni-
lateral contract.'O°
91. In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112, 116-17
(Mich. 1989) (citations omitted).
92. See, eg., cases cited infra note 111.
93. See Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REv. 551, 565 (1983).
94. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
95. See Pettit, supra note 93, at 552-53.
96. See id at 552-53, 565-67; see also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PELMLO, CON-
TRACTS § 2-10 (3d ed. 1987).
97. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
98. Id at 626 n.3.
99. Id at 624-25.
100. Id. at 631.
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The Minnesota court identified four requisite elements for the for-
mation of a unilateral contract: offer, communication, acceptance, and
consideration. 101 The court held that promissory handbook language,
such as the bank's disciplinary procedures, could constitute a sufficient
offer. 102 The communication element was satisfied, in turn, by dissemi-
nation of the handbook to the employee."0 The court stated that both of
the remaining factors, acceptance and consideration, were satisfied by the
employee's "continued performance despite his freedom to leave.""l°4 In
dispensing with the traditional requirement of additional consideration
beyond job performance, the Pine River court explained:
The requirement of additional consideration, like the at-will rule itself, is
more a rule of construction than of substance, and it does not preclude
the parties, if they make clear their intent to do so, from agreeing that the
employment will not be terminable by the employer except pursuant to
their agreement, even though no consideration other than services to be
performed is expected by the employer or promised by the employee.1
0 5
The Pine River court also concluded that no technical mutuality of obli-
gation was necessary if the employee fulfilled the consideration element
by continuing to stay on the job. 106
101. Id at 626-27.
102. Id at 627.
103. Id at 626. In Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill.
1987), the Illinois Supreme Court expressed the communication requirement as follows: "mhe
statement must be disseminated to the employee in such a manner that the employee is aware of its
contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer." The most difficult application of this element
arises when a handbook is not distributed directly to certain employees, but they nonetheless are
aware of its terms. Compare Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 757 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)
(finding that limited distribution of handbook to supervisory personnel for internal management
purposes does not rise to contractual obligation enforceable by non-supervisory employees), certifica-
tion denied, 550 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1988) with Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765, 775 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984) (suggesting that handbook policies may constitute an offer even if employee knowledge is
derived from casual sources).
104. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983). Most courts adher-
ing to the unilateral contract approach will simply presume acceptance and consideration from the
employee's continued performance of work. Id at 626-29; see also Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche,
Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267, 1270 (N.J. 1985) (holding that an employment manual constitutes a
unilateral contract offer and that the offer becomes binding when employees who may quit at any
time nevertheless continue to work).
105. 333 N.W.2d at 629; see also Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445 (N.Y.
1982) (holding that despite employee's right to quit at will, employer was not free to terminate
employee by claiming that contract lacked mutuality); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765, 775
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (finding that employees accepted new severance pay policy by continuing to
work after learning of it). In support of its position, the Pine River court specifically cited R.SrATE-
MENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTRAcTs § 80 cmt. a (1981) for the proposition that a single performance,
such as continued work, may furnish consideration for any number of promises. 333 N.W.2d at 629.
106. Most courts reject the need for "mutuality of obligation," arguing that mutuality is archaic
and discredited. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 629; see also Weiner, 443 N.E.2d at 445. Others argue
that the mutuality concept applies only to bilateral and not to unilateral contracts. See, e.g., Eales v.
Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, 663 P.2d 958, 959-60 (Alaska 1983); Helle, 472 N.E.2d at
776-77.
1991/1992]
342 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:326
The Pine River court cautioned, however, that not all handbook
statements would rise to the level of a contractual obligation. The court
explained that handbook language constituted an offer for a unilateral
contract only if "definite in form."'10 7 Thus, the job security language in
the bank's handbook did not convey an offer because it contained only
"general statements of policy."' 0 In contrast, the Minnesota court
found an offer in the handbook's section on disciplinary procedures be-
cause this portion promised a specific set of procedural steps in definite,
nondiscretionary language."° As summarized by the Illinois Supreme
Court's description of the Pine River criterion, a handbook statement, in
order to rise to a unilateral contract offer, "must contain a promise clear
enough that an employee would reasonably believe that an offer has been
made."110
Most of the decisions enforcing handbook language appear to apply
unilateral contract principles."' Yet unilateral contract analysis fits un-
easily into the handbook context." 2 Except for the communication pre-
107. 333 N.W.2d at 626.
108. Id. at 630. The "job security" section did not contain language promising discharge only
for "cause" or limited to any specified set of circumstances. Instead, the section contained only
rather generalized and imprecise statements to the effect that employment in the banking industry is
"very stable" and that the bank, in turn, expects "diligence, cooperation and dependability" from its
employees. Idk at 626 n.2.
Other courts similarly refuse to construe handbook statements as offers where handbook lan-
guage fails to limit the reasons for employee discharge, eg., Arnold v. Diet Ctr., Inc., 746 P.2d 1040,
1043 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (finding specified grounds for termination expressly "illustrative," not
"all-inclusive"); where the language is discretionary, eg., Stewart v. Chevron Chem. Co., 762 P.2d
1143, 1145-46 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (holding policy statement that management "should" con-
sider performance, experience, and length of service in determining layoffs merely advisory); or
where the language lacks specificity, eg., Davis v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp.
1273, 1281 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that insufficiently specific language did not create a binding
contractual term).
109. 333 N.W.2d at 626 n.3, 630.
110. Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill. 1987).
111. See, e.g., Hofflnann-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 735 (Ala. 1987) (holding
that handbook language created offer for binding unilateral contract); Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318
(finding enforceable contractual rights created in handbook); Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446
N.W.2d 451, 456 (Iowa 1989) (finding terms of handbook not sufficiently definite to support sanction
for breach of unilateral employment contract); Johnston v. Panhandle Coop. Ass'n, 408 N.W.2d
261, 266 (Neb. 1987) (holding that only handbook provisions which meet usual requirements for
unilateral contracts are sufficient to support enforcement); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491
A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J. 1985) (holding that an implied promise in a handbook was enforceable even if
employment otherwise would be at-will, absent a clear and prominent disclaimer); Small v. Springs
Indus., 357 S.E.2d 452 (S.C. 1987) (holding that question of whether handbook terms constituted an
employment contract was for the jury to decide).
112. Commentators are divided on the suitability of analyzing employee handbooks by reference
to unilateral contract principles. At least one has suggested that unilateral contract theory is the
"most logical and internally consistent methodology." Murray Tabb, Employee Innocence and the
Privileges of Power: Reappraisal of Implied Contract Rights, 52 Mo. L. REV. 803, 820-21 (1987); see
also Chagares, supra note 33, at 373 n.71 (arguing that courts should apply unilateral contract analy-
sis when enforcing employer promises); Winters, supra note 18, at 213. Others maintain that unilat-
eral contract theory is a less than ideal analytical tool in this context. See, e.g., Peter Linzer, The
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requisite, all of Pine River's unilateral contract elements are implied by
the court rather than intended by the parties. Like the bank in Pine
River, most employers have no intention of extending a contractual offer
when issuing an employee handbook. 1 3 Similarly, the court infers the
employee's acceptance and consideration from conduct that, in reality,
could occur regardless of the handbook's existence."14
The notion of a bargained-for exchange in this setting is a fiction,"'
but the fiction is convenient and understandable. These advantages have
induced courts to stretch unilateral contract theory in order to achieve a
desirable policy result: the enforcement of handbook promises that bene-
fit employers by creating legitimate expectations among the work force.
b. Promissory Estoppel
Promissory estoppel represents a second theoretical basis for the en-
forcement of handbook statements. Some courts reject unilateral con-
tract analysis in favor of the promissory estoppel approach," 6 while
others recognize promissory estoppel as an alternative, coexisting theo-
retical justification. 1 7 Still another group of decisions fails to articulate
any particular theoretical framework, but scrutinizes handbook state-
ments in terms of equitable principles that resemble the doctrine of
promissory estoppel."18
Decline ofAssen" At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20
GA. L. REV. 323, 345 (1985) ("[S]ome courts [in handbook cases] have found agreements under
circumstances that would probably garner a first-year Contracts student an F."). These commenta-
tors suggest that the courts are straining unilateral contract concepts to reach the desired result. See
id at 345, 356, 379; David A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppe, Contract
Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. CH. L. REV. 903, 920-21 (1985); Note, The Use of
Disclaimers to Avoid Employer Liability Under Employee Handbook Provisions, 12 J. CORP. L. 105,
111 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Use of Disclaimers].
113. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Minn. 1983).
114. Courts following the unilateral contract approach presume acceptance and consideration
from an employee's continued performance of work after receiving the handbook. See supra notes
101-105 and accompanying text.
115. See Sarah C. Steefel, Case Note, At Will Employment-Contractual Limitation of an Em-
ployer's Right to Terminate, 7 HAMLINE L. REv. 463, 476-77 (1984) (criticizing the Pine River
decision for presuming that a contract existed where neither party was aware of it).
116. See, eg., Jones v. East Ctr. for Community Mental Health, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 969, 973-74
(Ohio CL App. 1984).
117. See, eg., Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711-12 (Colo. 1987); see also
Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 153-55 (Ohio 1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087-88 (Wash. 1984).
118. See, eg., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984) (hold-
ing that employer which issues policy statement, and explicitly or implicitly encourages reliance on
that policy, cannot selectively adhere to it); In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting
Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112, 119 (Mich. 1989) (finding that the enforceability of written personnel policies
arises from the benefit employer obtains by creating a stable and dependable work environment);
Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 707 (Wyo. 1985) (finding that handbook provi-
sions created an expectation that they would be followed and induced employee to continue
employment).
1991/1992]
INDUSTRIAL REL,4TIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:326
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts describes promissory estop-
pel as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of a promisee or a third person and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. 19
Thus, promissory estoppel is similar to unilateral contract analysis in
providing a basis for enforcing a promissory statement without the re-
quirement of a return promise. Another similarity is that courts tend to
find "promises" in circumstances similar to those in which they find "of-
fers" under a unilateral contract theory. 120 The principal difference be-
tween the two theories lies in the role of the promisee. Under unilateral
contract analysis, an enforceable obligation arises only if the promisee
furnishes an acceptance accompanied by consideration. Enforcement is
justified by the existence of an implicit, bargained-for exchange. 12
Promissory estoppel, at least as traditionally construed, focuses instead
on the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance and requires neither ac-
ceptance nor consideration. 22 Enforcement is justified by reasonable ex-
pectations and a sense of fairness.'
23
The promissory estoppel analysis offers two advantages in the hand-
book arena. First, promissory estoppel appropriately focuses on the le-
gitimacy of employee expectations rather than on the somewhat
fictionalized search for the contract law technicalities of acceptance and
consideration. Second, promissory estoppel theory goes beyond the
promise principle to consider explicitly the underlying equities or "injus-
tice" of enforcement or nonenforcement. 124 While the equity factor may
well drive many of the handbook cases under either theory, promissory
estoppel analysis does so openly and directly instead of covertly through
a manipulation of other factors.
On the other hand, the difficulty of satisfying the reliance require-
ment is a potential drawback of promissory estoppel theory.' 21 Some
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
120. Handbook language, if sufficiently definite in form, may qualify as either an "offer" for a
unilateral contract or a "promise" enforceable under a theory of promissory estoppel. See generally
Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d at 711-12; Mers, 483 N.E.2d at 153-55.
121. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
122. See Clare Tully, Note, Challenging the Employment-At-Will Doctrine Through Modern
Contract Theory, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 449, 459 (1983) (noting that under a promissory estoppel
approach, "unbargained-for reliance frequently is regarded as the equivalent of consideration").
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); see also De Frank v. County of
Greene, 412 A.2d 663, 667 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) ("To reject an estoppel here would amount to
placing our imprimatur upon an inequitable manipulation of employees' legitimate expectations as to
the stated terms and conditions of their relationship with their employer.").
124. See Pettit, supra note 93, at 591.
125. See a at 592; Pratt, supra note 16, at 216. A further potential drawback is that some
courts have traditionally limited recovery under the promissory estoppel theory to reliance damages.
See eg., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 276-77 (Wis. 1965); Goodman v.
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courts have refused to enforce handbook promises when the employee
seeking relief failed to prove detrimental reliance on specific handbook
terms. 126 A strict prerequisite of individual reliance is troublesome both
because of practical problems of proof and because the requirement
would produce inconsistent levels of job security among employees cov-
ered by the same handbook language. 27 As a result, most courts, re-
gardless of the theoretical framework, dispense with the necessity of
proving individual, subjectively based reliance in favor of a rule requiring
only objectively based group reliance.128 That is, the reliance element is
satisfied if the employer's distribution of a handbook creates reasonable
expectations of job security among the employees as a group. If legiti-
mate expectations are created as to a class of employees, individual reli-
ance will be presumed. 129
c. Searching for a New Theory
Thus far, the vast majority of handbook cases have relied on one or
both of these two theoretical bases. This inclination to fit the analysis of
employee handbooks within the familiar context of existing legal pige-
onholes is not surprising. Each theory is well recognized and lends legiti-
macy to a new phenomenon in the law. But neither theory provides an
ideal framework for handbook analysis. In particular, neither theory has
kept pace with newly recognized policy justifications for handbook en-
forcement. A revised theoretical formula is needed that reflects the un-
derlying policy basis for enforcing handbook promises-employer
benefits derived from collective employee expectations.
Dicker, 169 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1948). Recent cases, however, suggest that full expectation
damages now are recoverable under the promissory estoppel approach, just as under a unilateral
contract approach. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 112, at 909-10.
126. See, eg., Karnes v. Doctors Hosp., 555 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Ohio 1990) ("It is incongruous
for appellant to suggest that she relied upon representations about which she was unaware."); Stew-
art v. Chevron Chem. Co., 762 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Wash. 1988) (no evidence was introduced to show
that the employee was aware of or relied on the handbook's layoff policies).
127. See Pettit, supra note 93, at 593.
128. See, eg., Loffa v. Intel Corp., 738 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that particular
reliance on the manual by the employee is not necessary in order for manual's personnel provisions
to be in effect); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980) (holding
that a manual may give an employee contractual rights even in the absence of mutual agreement or
signing of a policy statement by employer and employee); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491
A.2d 1257, 1268 (N.J. 1985) (presuming reliance by employee on promises in manual in order to
avoid unequal protection of employees' rights); see also Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, Ltd.,
724 P.2d 110, 117 (Haw. 1986) ("Inasmuch as CP Air circulated the rules with an intention 'to
create expectations and induce reliance by employees as a group, it should not be able to escape
liability on the grounds that a particular employee was unaware of the rules and thus did not receive
a promise.'" (quoting Pettit, supra note 93, at 583)).
129. See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1268 (N.J. 1985). The Woolley
court drew an analogy between the employee handbook and a collective bargaining agreement in
explaining that an employee covered by a set of rules applicable to a class need not be cognizant of
specific provisions in order to obtain the benefits of the document. Id. at 1268 n.10.
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Two recent developments may portend movement in this direction.
First, a recent study of more than 100 promissory estoppel decisions
found that proof of a particularized detrimental reliance is no longer the
key prerequisite to enforcement of promises under a promissory estoppel
theory.130 Professors Farber and Matheson conclude that the courts now
tend to premise recovery on the presence of a credible promise accompa-
nied by an economic benefit to the promisor in the context of an ongoing
economic relationship.13 Farber and Matheson point to handbook cases
such as Pine River as examples of this revised promissory estoppel ap-
proach,132 even though many of the decisions, including Pine River itself,
are couched in the language of unilateral contract analysis.133 The new
formulation has considerable appeal in guiding handbook analysis, not
only because the employer-employee arrangement is a prime example of
a continuing economic relationship, but also because the focus on the
benefits potentially gained by the employer coincides with a major policy
rationale for enforcing handbook promises.
A significant contribution of the Farber and Matheson study is its
recognition that the essential bargain in many continuing economic rela-
tionships, like that of employer and employee, does not involve either a
specific transactional exchange (as in the traditional unilateral contract
setting) or an instance of individualized detrimental reliance (as in the
traditional promissory estoppel setting). 34 Instead, the bargain arises
out of a long-term relationship characterized by the need for a high level
of confidence and trust.135 The authors explain that while the role of
individual reliance is on the decline, collective reliance, "in the form of
trust, is on the rise as the policy behind legal rules of promissory obliga-
tion." 136 Thus, the authors conclude, promises made for the purpose of
obtaining an economic benefit in the context of an ongoing relationship
should be enforced even in the absence of an explicit bargained-for
exchange.
137
A similar approach was adopted in a recent decision that may point
the way to a sui generis approach to analyzing employee handbooks. In
In re Certified Question: Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 131 the Michi-
130. Farber & Matheson, supra note 112, at 904. The authors state that while "courts still feel
constrained to speak the language of reliance, their holdings can best be understood and harmonized
on other grounds." Id.
131. Id at 914.
132. Id at 920-22.
133. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622,626-27 (Minn. 1983). The decision
is discussed supra at notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
134. Farber & Matheson, supra note 112, at 925-29.
135. Id.
136. Id at 929.
137. Id.
138. 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989).
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gan Supreme Court considered whether an employer could unilaterally
alter the employment relationship of existing employees by modifying
discharge-for-cause policy statements contained in a previously issued
employee handbook. The Bankey court noted the lack of consensus
about which legal theory appropriately underlies the handbook excep-
tion, and reviewed decisions that followed the unilateral contract and
promissory estoppel approaches.139 Finding both theories inadequate,
the Michigan Supreme Court returned instead to the policies underlying
its landmark Toussaint",' decision some nine years earlier:
Under Toussaint, written personnel policies are not enforceable because
they have been "offered and accepted" as a unilateral contract; rather,
their enforceability arises from the benefit the employer derives by estab-
lishing such policies.
Under the Toussaint analysis, an employer who chooses to establish
desirable personnel policies, such as a discharge-for-cause employment
policy, is not seeking to induce each individual employee to show up for
work day after day, but rather is seeking to promote an environment
conducive to collective productivity. The benefit to the employer of pro-
moting such an environment, rather than the traditional contract-form-
ing mechanisms of mutual assent or individual detrimental reliance, gives
rise to a situation "instinct with an obligation."' 41
The Bankey court correctly perceived that the real reason for enforcing
handbook promises does not rest on implicit notions of either "mutual
assent or individual detrimental reliance."' 42  Instead, handbook
promises should be enforced if they benefit an employer by encouraging
employee expectations that lead to an "environment conducive to collec-
tive productivity."' 143
In spite of the lack of consensus about which legal theory is best
suited for analyzing employee handbooks, the courts, in general, have
spent little time agonizing over the appropriate theoretical framework.
Regardless of articulated theoretical prerequisites, courts find a way to
enforce handbook promises that reflect the combined equities of em-
ployer benefit and legitimate employee expectations of some sort of job
security. Both the unilateral contract and promissory estoppel doctrines
are flexible enough to accomplish this task when equitable circumstances
so dictate. However, matters of theory become more significant and
more difficult when disclaimers are added to the mix.
139. Id at 116-19.
140. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). The decision is
discussed supra at notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
141. 443 N.W.2d at 119.
142. Id
143. Id
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II.
HANDBOOK DISCLAIMERS
A. Introduction
The judicial transformation of employee handbooks into enforceable
obligations sent shock waves throughout the management sector. The
bank president in Pine River, for example, had no idea that he had cre-
ated a contract when he issued an employee handbook upon the advice of
a human resources consultant.
144
The courts were not unaware of the significant change worked by
their decisions. A number of the same courts that first announced the
enforceability of handbook promises sought to ameliorate the impact of
this doctrine by suggesting means by which employers could avoid liabil-
ity.145 The advice offered by the Arizona Supreme Court was typical:
We do not mean to imply that all personnel manuals will become part of
employment contracts. Employers are certainly free to issue no person-
nel manual at all or to issue a personnel manual that clearly and conspic-
uously tells their employees that the manual is not part of the
employment contract and that their jobs are terminable at the will of the
employer with or without reason.'
46
Thus, an employer could protect itself by not issuing a manual at all, by
omitting any promissory language from the handbook, or by limiting the
legal effect of the handbook through the inclusion of a disclaimer.
Few employers responded by withdrawing handbooks already is-
sued. The more attractive alternative was the disclaimer.147 This option
was particularly enticing to employers since it offered them the possibil-
ity of continuing to obtain the benefits of a handbook policy, while avoid-
ing liability that might otherwise arise from promissory language
contained in the handbook.
A number of courts, at least in the abstract, joined the Arizona
Supreme Court in suggesting that disclaimers could preclude the enforce-
ment of handbook statements.'48 This result finds theoretical support
144. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Minn. 1983).
145. See eg., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984) (by
"either not issuing a personnel manual or issuing one with clear language of limitation"); Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (Mich. 1980) (by making known to employees
that personnel policies are subject to unilateral change by employer); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985) (by including "very prominent" statement that em-
ployer promises nothing and remains free to change all working conditions without consulting any-
one); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. 1984) (by specifically stating "in
a conspicuous manner" that contents are not intended to be part of the employment relationship, or
by specifically asserting employer's right to modify policies).
146. Leikvold, 688 P.2d at 174.
147. See generally Chagares, supra note 33, at 365; Note, Unjust Dismissal of Employees at Will:
Are Disclaimers a Final Solution, 15 FoRDHAM URBAN L.J. 533 (1987).
148. See cases cited supra note 145.
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under either a unilateral contract or a promissory estoppel approach.
Under the former, a disclaimer defeats contract formation by clarifying
that the employer does not intend that the handbook statements consti-
tute an offer to enter into a unilateral contract. 49 A disclaimer may also
succeed under a promissory estoppel approach if it dispels expectations
of job security that might otherwise arise from handbook statements. 5 '
Nonetheless, a significant disjunction has emerged between theory and
practice. In at least forty-five decisions published over the past decade,
courts have refused to interpret disclaimers as dispositively negating the
legal status of handbook promises. 5' In theory, disclaimers protect em-
ployers from liability; in practice, they often do not. Resolving this dis-
cordance requires adjustment of either theory or practice or both.
B. Designing Disclaimers
A "disclaimer," in its most basic sense, is an attempt to repudiate or
deny a potential claim.152 In the context of employee handbooks, the
essential purpose of a disclaimer is to claim at-will status for the employ-
ment relationship by repudiating or denying liability for statements ex-
pressed in the handbook.' 53
Employers use disclaimers of varying format and language to ac-
complish this objective. Perhaps the most common type of disclaimer is
one set out in the handbook itself.'5 4 The handbook disclaimer typically
states that nothing contained in the handbook should be construed as a
contract and that the employment relationship may be terminated with-
out cause.' 55 Some employers place similar language in a separate docu-
149. See, eg., Anders v. Mobil Chem. Co., 559 N.E.2d 1119, 1122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding
that disclaimer in handbook makes it clear that the employer is promising nothing); Woolley, 491
A.2d at 1271 (holding that a manual's provisions are considered binding unless there is proof that
the employer intended otherwise).
150. See, eg., Therrien v. United Air Lines, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1517, 1521-23 (D. Colo. 1987)
(holding that employee cannot enforce manual's grievance procedures by promissory estoppel be-
cause disclaimers preclude any justifiable reliance on manual's terms); Leikvold, 688 P.2d at 174
(holding that if an employer articulates a policy statement in a manual, and encourages reliance on
it, he must consistently abide by the policy).
151. These decisions are listed in the appendix, infra at 382-85, and are discussed infra Part
II.C.2.
152. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 645 (unabridged 1981).
153. See generally Chagares, supra note 33, at 376-78 (summarizing value to employer of "non-
promissory" "informational" descriptions of the employment relationship and role of disclaimers in
seeking to maintain non-promissory character of such communications).
154. Chagares, supra note 33, at 386.
155. One court enforced a disclaimer which stated:
The contents of this handbook DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE TERMS OF A CON-
TRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. Nothing contained in this handbook should be construed
as a guarantee of continued employment, but rather, employment with the bank is on an
"at will" basis. This means that the employment relationship may be terminated at any
time by either the employee or the Bank for any reason not expressly prohibited by law.
Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 721 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (D. Ariz. 1988); see also Arnold v. Diet
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ment, such as an employment application. 156 The "at-will agreement" is
yet another variation. These agreements take the form of a written con-
tract, usually executed at the time of initial employment, in which the
parties expressly acknowledge their at-will status.
15 7
A veritable industry has developed around the design of successful
disclaimers. Experts and consultants recommend methods by which an
employer can "sanitize"' 5 handbooks (as well as other documents) to
"avoid unintended legal consequences."' 59 For example, the American
Society of Personnel Administration Foundation has drafted a model dis-
claimer containing four recommended features.16° In addition to the
usual denial of contract status and retention of the right to dismiss at
will, the Foundation's model disavows the effect of any conflicting repre-
sentations and reserves the right to modify handbook policies on a unilat-
eral basis. 6 ' Disclaimer experts also provide advice to employers on
how to enhance the clarity and conspicuousness of disclaimers, "62 and
Ctr., Inc., 746 P.2d 1040, 1041 n.1 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (enforcing as a matter of law a disclaimer
that stated: "This handbook is not an employment contract, and an employee can be terminated at
any time."); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 517 A.2d 786, 788 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986)
(enforcing on motion for summary judgment a disclaimer which stated: "[Tihis handbook does not
constitute an express or implied contract. The employee may separate from his/her employment at
any time; the Hospital reserves the right to do the same."), cert denied, 523 A.2d 1013 (Md. 1987).
156. See, e.g., Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1986) (employment
application included statement: "In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules
and regulations of Sears, Roebuck and Co., and my employment and compensation can be termi-
nated with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time, at the option of either the
Company or myself."); see also Gianaculas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F.2d 1391, 1391-92
(9th Cir. 1985) (employment application containing condition: "If given employment I hereby agree
that such employment may be terminated without advance notice and without liability to me for
wages or salary .... ).
157. For a discussion of at-will agreements, see Keenan McClenahan, Note, At Will Employ-
ment Agreements: New Focus for Shielding Employers From Wrongful Termination Suits?, 17 W. ST.
U.L. REv. 131, 133 -36 (1989). Though most prevalent in California, the use of at-will agreements is
not limited to that state. See, e.g., Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 757, 761 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987), certification denied, 550 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1988).
158. See LOPATKA, supra note 1, at 27-30.
159. DECKER, supra note 1, at 210.
160. See LAURENCE LORBER ET AL., FEAR oF FIRn 22 (1984). This model disclaimer pro-
vides as follows:
This is not a contract of employment. Any individual may voluntarily leave employment
upon proper notice, and may be terminated by the employer at any time and for any rea-
son. Any oral or written statements or promises to the contrary are hereby expressly dis-
avowed and should not be relied upon by any prospective or existing employee. The
contents of this handbook are subject to change at any time at the discretion of the
employer.
161. Id. Model disclaimers abound. For other proposed models, see JEROME B. KAUFF &
MAUREEN E. MCCLAIN, UNJUST DIsMIsSAL 1984-EVALUATNG, LITIGATING, SETLING, AND
AVOIDING CLAIMS 777-78 (1984); Decker, supra note 1, at 223-24; see also 1 LrrrLER, MENDEL-
SOHN, FASTIFF & TICHY, THE 1990 EMPLOYER 0-16 to -17 (on file with the author, a San Francisco,
California law firm); Richard G. Moon, Avoiding Liability for Wrongful Discharge-Management
Planning and Litigation Tactics, 62 MICH. BAR J. 780, 780-81 (1983).
162. See, eg., Chagares, supra note 33, at 381-86; Decker, supra note 1, at 220-22; Moon, supra
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recommend various procedural steps aimed at limiting potential
liability. 1
63
C. Limitations on Disclaimer Enforcement
1. In General
Courts generally have been enforcing disclaimers where the em-
ployer followed the steps recommended by disclaimer industry ex-
perts. 16 Disclaimers are most likely to succeed if no handbook is issued
or if the handbook contains nothing that could reasonably be interpreted
as promising a limitation on the at-will presumption.165 The outcome is
less predictable, however, if an employer couples a disclaimer with hand-
book language promising some sort of job security. 66 In this situation,
the disclaimer runs counter to policy reasons that favor enforcing prom-
issory handbook language. If the disclaimer is given effect in this con-
text, the employer gains a windfall by obtaining the benefits of a
handbook without following through on the expectations that the hand-
book creates.
In spite of the theoretically preclusive effect of disclaimers, a
number of courts have sought ways to avoid the perceived inequities of
this windfall result. As discussed below, the reasons courts give for de-
nying enforcement vary. The basic method, however, is nearly universal.
Courts deny the dispositive enforcement of disclaimers by treating the
disclaimer issue as a question of fact for the jury.
The court and the jury both have responsibilities in handbook cases.
In general, the issue of whether handbook language gives rise to an en-
forceable contract obligation is a question of fact for the jury. 167 On the
other hand, the construction of a contract is a matter of law for the court
note 161, at 781; Richard J. Simmons, Reviewing the Employee Handbook, Hum. Resources Mgmt.
(CCH) No. 61 (March 23, 1984).
163. For example, a number of sources recommend that employers require employees to ex-
pressly acknowledge awareness of the disclaimer and its terms. See Chagares, supra note 33, at 387-
89; Lopatka, supra note 1, at 29. A number of cases have pointed to an employee's express acknowl-
edgment of disclaiming language as a basis for denying enforcement of handbook provisions. See,
e.g., Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co., 855 F.2d 1225, 1233 (6th Cir. 1988) (employee requested to sign
tear-out page from employee handbook, signed page then placed in the employee's personnel file);
Arnold v. Diet Ctr., Inc., 746 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (employee requested to sign
acknowledgment of disclaimer on cover page of handbook).
164. See, eg., Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co., 855 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Michigan
law); Lee v. Sperry Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1415 (D. Minn. 1987); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp.,
517 A.2d 786 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1986), cer. denied, 523 A.2d 1013 (Md. 1987); Ware v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 757 (Super. CL App. Div. 1987), certification denied, 550 A.2d 450 (N.J.
1988); Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 417 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1987).
165. See Note, Use of Disclaimers, supra note 112, at 118-19.
166. See id. (noting that even the "perfect disclaimer" is unlikely to work if combined with
express promises of job security).
167. See, eg., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984);
Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 765 P.2d 619, 623 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Small v.
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where the terms are clear and unambiguous. 16 8 Courts that dispositively
enforce disclaimers typically do so as a matter of law. These cases never
reach the jury because the court construes the disclaimer as unambigu-
ously negating the possibility of an enforceable obligation. 1 69
In contrast, cases denying the dispositive enforcement of a dis-
claimer generally do so by turning the disclaimer issue over to the jury.
The courts in these decisions, for various reasons, find that the presence
of a disclaimer does not unambiguously determine the broader issue of
handbook enforcement. 170 Instead, these decisions authorize the jury to
determine whether the handbook, even with a disclaimer, constitutes an
enforceable obligation. 17 1 Given the likelihood that the jury will be more
sympathetic to the underdog employee,' 72 this procedure significantly
undercuts the legal effectiveness of disclaimers.
2. Reasons for Non-Enforcement of Disclaimers
The courts have been very resourceful in finding reasons not to give
dispositive legal effect to disclaimers. 173 These reasons fall into four gen-
eral categories: procedural defects, timing flaws, restrictions arising from
extraneous evidence, and substantive limitations.
a Procedural Defects
A disclaimer will be given effect as a matter of law only if expressed
clearly and conspicuously. 74 If the employer fails to fulfill this threshold
Springs Indus., Inc., 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (S.C. 1987). Of course, the judge will decide this issue if
she is playing the role of fact finder.
168. Leikvold, 688 P.2d at 174; see also Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 706
(Wyo. 1985); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 7.14 (2d ed. 1990).
169. See, e.g., Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970, 973-74 (6th Cir. 1987); Eldridge
v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 417 N.W.2d 797, 799-800 (N.D. 1987).
170. See, e.g., Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1476-77 (10th Cir. 1988); Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1037-38 (Ariz. 1985); Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d
841 (Kan. 1987).
171. See, e.g., Dalton v. Herbruck Egg Sales Corp., 417 N.W.2d 496, 498 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987); Stone v. Mission Bay Mortgage Co., 672 P.2d 629, 630 (Nev. 1983); Preston v. Claridge Hotel
& Casino, Ltd., 555 A.2d 12, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
172. See Julius M. Steiner & Allan M. Dabrow, The Questionable Value of the Inclusion of
Language Confirming Employment at-Will Status in Company Personnel Documents, 37 LAB. L.J.
639, 644 (1986) ("Almost every jury member is, or once was, someone's employee. Consequently, a
jury's sympathies are with the discharged employee. A typical citizen believes that it is simply
wrong for employers, as important members of the American society, to discharge employees for
reasons that are perceived to be unfair.").
173. Mani courts cite multiple reasons for not enforcing a disclaimer as a matter of law. See,
e.g., Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, Ltd., 555 A.2d 12, 14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
(refusing to enforce disclaimer due to inadequate notice and lack of clarity); McGinnis v. Honeywell,
Inc., 791 P.2d 452, 456-57 (N.M. 1990) (declining to enforce disclaimer because of both ambiguous
application to separate document and necessity of considering norms of conduct).
174. See e.g., Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 787-88 (Alaska 1989);
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1037-38 (Ariz. 1985); Jimenez v. Colo-
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prerequisite, the impact of the disclaimer on the enforceability of the
handbook language properly becomes a matter for the jury to
determine. 1
7
(1) Lack of Clarity
In Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital,"7 6 the Arizona
Supreme Court overturned a lower court's grant of summary judgment
because of a disclaimer's lack of clarity. The hospital had distributed a
handbook providing for a four-step disciplinary procedure applicable
prior to termination. The handbook also listed thirty-two instances in
which the procedure was not to apply and concluded with a statement
that these exceptions "are not inclusive and are only guidelines."' 177 The
lower court treated the quoted language as a disclaimer that effectively
negated any rights that might otherwise have arisen from the hand-
book.178 The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the con-
cluding provision did not clearly disavow the applicability of the four-
step procedure.17 9 Since reasonable persons could draw different infer-
ences from the meaning of the handbook language, the disclaimer could
not be enforced as a matter of law and its effect was appropriately an
issue for the jury to resolve.'"I
The disclaimer at issue in Wagenseller fell far short of the ideal rec-
ommended by disclaimer industry experts. These experts recommend
that a disclaimer, at a minimum, inform employees that the handbook
does not constitute a contract and that the employment relationship may
be terminated at the will of either party.'8 ' If this information is stated
unambiguously and with a minimum of legalese, the disclaimer is un-
likely to fail on clarity grounds."8 2
The status of disclaimers falling between the poles of the experts'
ideal and the disclaimer in Wagenseller are less certain. A number of
courts have declined to enforce disclaimers that, though stated more
clearly than in Wagenseller, failed to comport fully with the experts' rec-
ommendations. For example, three courts have refused to enforce as a
matter of law disclaimers that denied contractual status but did not ex-
rado Interstate Gas Co., 690 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Wyo. 1988); see also cases cited infra notes 176-
205.
175. See, eg., Jones, 779 P.2d at 787-88; Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1037-38.
176. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
177. Id. at 1037.
178. Ia
179. Id at 1037-38.
180. Ia at 1038; see also Harvet v. Unity Medical Ctr., Inc., 428 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988); Brookshaw v. South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
181. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
182. See generally Chagares, supra note 33, at 380-86.
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pressly notify employees that they could be terminated at will.183 As one
of these courts noted, such a disclaimer is unclear because it speaks in
terms of the technicalities of contract status without plainly stating the
practical impact of the disclaimer on apparent promises of job security
contained elsewhere in the handbook.18 4 Similarly, a recent federal court
decision found unclear a disclaimer that merely defined the employment
relationship as "at-will."' 5 The court explained that this language did
not clearly disavow the enforceability of "other manual provisions im-
posing conditions unrelated to the duration of the [employment]
contract."'
18 6
The extent to which courts will search for ambiguities in disclaimers
in order to avoid an inequitable result is illustrated in Morris v. Chem-
Lawn Corp. 187 In that case, an employee claimed an implied contract
right to her position for as long as she performed her duties satisfactorily.
The employer moved for summary judgment, relying on the terms of an
at-will agreement that stated that "[t]he Employee's employment with
the Company may be terminated by either party at any time."'"" In spite
of this seemingly clear language, the court found the disclaimer ambigu-
ous because it did not expressly state whether the right to terminate
could be exercised for any reason or only upon a showing of good
cause.
89
(2) Ambiguity of Coverage
Disclaimers frequently fail when their application to separate docu-
ments or statements is ambiguous.' 90 This situation occurs most fre-
quently when the disclaimer is contained in a document other than the
handbook itself. Thus, in at least seven cases, courts have found a dis-
claimer in one document insufficient to dispel as a matter of law expecta-
tions created by statements in other sources.' 91
183. Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1989); Preston v. Clar-
idge Hotel & Casino, Ltd., 555 A.2d 12, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Johnson v. Nasca, 802
P.2d 1294, 1295-97 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990).
184. See Preston, 555 A.2d at 15.
185. Wojcik v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 732 F. Supp. 940 (N.D. Ill. 1990); see also
Haselrig v. Public Storage Inc., 585 A.2d 294 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (finding unclear a statement
that the employment relationship is "predicated on an at will basis").
186. Wojcik, 732 F. Supp. at 942.
187. 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
188. Id. at 481.
189. Id. The court nevertheless went on to grant the employer's summary judgment motion on
the grounds that the employee's claim was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at
484.
190. A disclaimer also may be ineffective if the definition of those employees covered by the
disclaimer is ambiguous. See, ag., Haselrig v. Public Storage Inc., 585 A.2d 294 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991); Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 409 N.W.2d 87, 89 (N.D. 1987).
191. See Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805, 809-10 (D. Colo. 1983) (hold-
ing that policy manual disclaimer did not necessarily dispel expectations); Loffa v. Intel Corp., 738
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A common scenario involves two separate documents: an employ-
ment application that sets forth a disclaimer and an employee handbook
that contains promises of job security. In this setting, courts often find a
question of fact concerning whether the disclaimer negates the state-
ments expressed in the separate handbook. 192 In McLain v. Great Ameri-
can Insurance Companies,193 for example, a California court of appeals
held that an at-will agreement included in an employment application
did not preclude the jury from considering the terms of a separately is-
sued employee handbook. The court explained that the application did
not contain an integration clause establishing the at-will agreement as an
integrated contract governing the employment relationship.1 94 Since the
disclaimer language did not unambiguously disavow other possible
sources of contract rights, the court upheld the jury's conclusion that the
handbook created an implied contract obligation to terminate only for
just cause. 195
The McLain opinion also revealed the court's underlying dislike for
disclaimers. The court noted that the at-will agreement was set out on a
standardized form that did not lend itself to any genuine individualized
bargaining. 196 The court suggested that such disclaimers, even if in the
form of an integrated agreement, should not bar consideration of extra-
neous evidence to establish the parties' actual intentions.'97
(3) Lack of Conspicuousness
A disclaimer will be effective only if communicated in a manner that
alerts employees to its existence.19 Since a disclaimer attempts to negate
rights that might otherwise flow from handbook promises, courts scruti-
P.2d 1146, 1151 (Ariz. 1987) (refusing to find disclaimer in "employee agreement" controlling);
Seubert v. McKesson Corp., 273 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that employment applica-
tion disclaimer was not dispositive); McLain v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 256 Cal. Rptr. 863, 867-69 (Ct.
App. 1989) (same); Stone v. Mission Bay Mortgage Co., 672 P.2d 629, 630 (Nev. 1983) (finding that
small print on employment application did not foreclose contrary expectations); McGinnis v. Hon-
eywell, Inc., 791 P.2d 452, 456-57 (N.M. 1990) (holding disclaimer in employee manual not disposi-
tive); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d 666, 667-74 (Wis. 1985) (finding employment application
disclaimer not dispositive).
192. See, eg., McLain, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 867-69; Ferraro, 368 N.W.2d at 667-74. Other courts,
however, have enforced disclaimers in employment applications so as to negate the contractual na-
ture of statements contained in an employee handbook. See, eg., Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790
F.2d 453, 461-62 (6th Cir. 1986).
193. 256 Cal. Rptr. 863 (Ct. App. 1989).
194. Id. at 1485. The Court of Appeals distinguished a prior case, Gerdlund v. Electronic Dis-
pensers Int'l, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279 (Ct. App. 1987), in which an at-will agreement in a comprehensive
contract containing an explicit integration clause was held to bar the introduction of extrinsic evi-
dence to support the employee's implied contract claim.
195. McLain v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 256 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868-70 (Ct. App. 1989).
196. Id. at 868.
197. Id. at 868-69.
198. See Montgomery v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 5 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1118, 1120
(N.D. Ill. 1990) ("An uncommunicated disclaimer is no disclaimer at all."). Many consultants rec-
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nize disclaimers to make sure that they are displayed conspicuously.199
Courts generally find disclaimers insufficiently conspicuous in two
situations. First, courts deny dispositive effect to disclaimers that are not
set off in a manner that draws attention to their terms. The court in
Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.,2° refusing to give effect as a mat-
ter of law to a disclaimer, observed:
The disclaimer in question is not set off in any way that would attract
attention. It falls under the heading "GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS"
and the subheading "CONTENTS." Nothing is capitalized that would
give notice of a disclaimer. The type size equals that of other provisions
on the same page. No border sets the disclaimer apart from any other
paragraph on the page.
Other courts have criticized disclaimers under similar circumstances. °1
Courts also reject disclaimers that are buried in lengthy handbooks.
For example, courts have refused to enforce dispositively a one-sentence
disclaimer followed by eighty-five pages of detailed text,20 2 as well as a
disclaimer placed on the last page of a fifty-two page handbook.2"3 Simi-
larly, an employer risks nonenforcement unless the disclaimer is dis-
played on a page that is prominent within the communication as a
whole.2°4
These procedural objections to the enforcement of handbook dis-
claimers are hardly revolutionary. They represent traditional standards
by which all contractual obligations are tested. Even the anti-disclaimer
slant of many of the decisions can be explained, in part, by the widely
ommend that employers preempt the issue of conspicuousness by requiring employees to acknowl-
edge awareness of the disclaimer. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
199. See, eg., Small v. Springs Indus., 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (S.C. 1987); McDonald v. Mobil
Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 871 (Wyo. 1990) (Golden, J., concurring), remanded, 820 P.2d
986 (Wyo. 1991); Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 690 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Wyo. 1988).
200. 690 F. Supp. at 980.
201. See, eg., Davis v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1273, 1280 (M.D. Tenn.
1990) (disclaimer not highlighted in any way, located on last page, and printed in smaller typeface
than most of handbook); Perman v. Arcventures, Inc., 554 N.E.2d 982, 987 (In. App. Ct. 1990)
(disclaimer "was not set off from the rest of the text, printed in capital letters or titled"); Belfatto v.
Robert Bosch Corp., No. 86-C-6632, 1987 WL 9569, at *2 (N.D. IlL. April 15, 1987) (disclaimer not
set off in different typeface); McDonald, 789 P.2d at 870 (Golden, J., concurring) (disclaimer was one
sentence, unlabeled, and no different in appearance from any other sentence). But cf Audette v.
Northeast State Bank, 436 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (suggesting that it would be
preferable to set out disclaimer in boldface type, but still enforcing disclaimer printed in regular
typeface).
202. Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1989).
203. Davis, 743 F. Supp. at 1280; see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d
1025, 1037 (Ariz. 1985) (disclaimer expressed as the last of 32 exceptions to a four-step disciplinary
procedure).
204. Chagares, supra note 33, at 385-86. Placement on the front page generally is considered
conspicuous. See, eg., Arnold v. Diet Ctr., Inc., 746 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987). But cf
McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 870 (Wyo. 1990) (Golden, J., concurring)
('The fact that the disclaimer appears on the front page does not by itself make it conspicuous."),
remanded, 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991).
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recognized rule2°s of construing ambiguous language against the drafting
party.
But more is at work here. Courts enforce these standards with ex-
ceptional vigor in cases involving handbook disclaimers, raising the pro-
cedural hurdles beyond mere neutral norms of construction. Rather, the
courts appear to resort to these objections as welcome escape routes that
enable them to avoid an uncomfortable and undesirable result.
b. Timing Flaws-The Problem of Unilateral Modification
Not all employers are in a position to consider from an unencum-
bered vantage point the options suggested by the Arizona Supreme
Court:2 " either not issuing a handbook at all or issuing one that includes
a clear disclaimer. Many employers have already distributed handbooks
that contain descriptions of job security policies but lack disclaiming lan-
guage. These employers confront two less attractive options in seeking to
avoid potential liability for their handbook statements. They can either
attempt to withdraw the handbook statements or reissue the handbook
with the inclusion of a disclaimer.
Both options raise potential problems. The previously issued hand-
book may have created enforceable expectations with respect to job se-
curity. If so, it is not clear that the employer can simply extinguish these
obligations on a unilateral basis.
Two points seem clear. First, an employer may not extinguish
rights already vested or accrued under an existing handbook policy.20
On the other hand, the courts will permit employers to modify existing
policies if this right was expressly reserved in the original handbook.20
Employer modifications taken pursuant to express reservation clauses are
treated not as unilateral, but rather as within the contemplation of the
original agreement.2 9
In the absence of a reservation clause, the courts are split about
whether the employer has a right to modify existing handbook
promises.2 10 Some courts have used a "reverse" unilateral contract anal-
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
206. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
207. See, eg., Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); see also Langdon
v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
208. See, eg., Lee v. Sperry Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (D. Minn. 1987); Shaver v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 669 F. Supp. 243, 247 (E.D. Wis. 1986), aff'd, 840 F.2d 1361 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
209. See Lee, 678 F. Supp. at 1418; Shaver, 669 F. Supp. at 247.
210. A number of courts have stated in dicta that an employer may unilaterally modify hand-
book statements. See eg., Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 734-35 (Ala.
1987); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980); Brookshaw v.
South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Some commentators describe
this position as the majority view. See, e-g., Pratt, supra note 16, at 219-20. Only a handful of
courts, however, have reached this conclusion when actually confronted with an employer's unilat-
1991/1992]
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 13:326
ysis to uphold an employer's right to modify handbook language through
the addition of a disclaimer. 1  In Chambers v. Valley National Bank,212
for example, the plaintiff claimed that the employer had wrongfully ter-
minated her employment without following the disciplinary procedures
described in the employee handbook. The employer moved for summary
judgment based on the terms of a handbook disclaimer. This disclaimer
had been added to a previously issued handbook shortly after the Ari-
zona Supreme Court had determined that handbook promises may be
legally enforceable. 213 The plaintiff argued that the employer could not
negate preexisting, enforceable handbook promises simply by issuing a
new handbook that contained a disclaimer.214 The Chambers court re-
lied on unilateral contract notions in rejecting this argument. The court
stated that "the inclusion of the disclaimer in the [later] publications may
best be considered an offer of a modification to a unilateral contract of
employment, which plaintiff accepted by continuing her employment
with defendant." '215 In essence, the Chambers court found that a modifi-
cation may occur in the same manner that gave rise to a unilateral con-
tract in the first place.
Courts adhering to the Chambers approach find the principles un-
derlying unilateral contract formation "equally applicable to the opposite
transformation." '216 Since the handbook obligation arose without express
mutual assent, these courts find no need to require mutual assent to effect
a modification of that obligation.21 7 Thus, the employee's continued
work after notice of the change provides the necessary acceptance and
consideration. 218 Any other result, these courts conclude, would unduly
restrict management flexibility in that policies once stated "could never
be changed short of successful negotiation with each employee who
eral withdrawal of handbook rights. See infra notes 211-32 and accompanying text. If only those
courts that have directly faced the modification issue are counted, the pro-modification and anti-
modification positions appear to be balanced at three decisions each. Compare note 211 and accom-
panying text with note 225 and accompanying text.
211. See White v. Federal Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1547-48 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff'd,
939 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1991); Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 721 F. Supp. 1128, 1131-32 (D. Ariz.
1988); Allen v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453, 1457 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1989).
212. 721 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Ariz. 1988).
213. Id at 1131.
214. Id
215. Id at 1131-32.
216. Lee v. Sperry Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (D. Minn. 1987) (upholding unilateral modi-
fication based on unilateral contract principles, but also based, at least in part, on presence of explicit
reservation clause).
217. See In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112, 116
(Mich. 1989) (permitting unilateral modification, but not premised on unilateral contract principles);
see also Allen v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453, 1457 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1989).
218. See.Lee, 678 F. Supp. at 1418; Allen v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 Indiv. Empl.
Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453, 1457 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
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worked while the policy was in effect." '219
Other courts are less receptive to the unilateral change prerogative.
Two courts have invalidated employer attempts to modify handbook
terms unilaterally on grounds of inadequate notice to the affected em-
ployees.220 In Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, Ltd.,221 the employer
issued a handbook detailing job expectations and disciplinary procedures.
The handbook was distributed at a general orientation meeting prior to
the opening of a new casino. Employer representatives explained the
provisions of the handbook, and all employees were required to sign a
form indicating that they understood its terms.222 A year later, the em-
ployer issued a revised handbook which was identical except for the addi-
tion of a disclaimer. This time, the employer simply asked employees to
pick up a copy of the new handbook and did not reorient employees
regarding the significance of the disclaimer.223 The court held that the
attempted modification failed to extinguish rights created by the first
handbook, explaining that the attenuated communication accompanying
the revision was inconsistent with notions of "basic honesty. '224
Three other courts have gone further, holding that an employer may
unilaterally withdraw enforceable handbook promises only upon mutual
consent and the provision of adequate additional consideration.225 The
three cases decided by these courts are very similar. In each instance, the
employer initially distributed a handbook that contained statements
describing job security policies. The employer then attempted to limit its
exposure by issuing a revised handbook or waiver disclaiming contrac-
tual liability. All three courts, when faced with wrongful discharge suits
premised on the handbook statements, refused to construe the newly ad-
ded disclaimers or employment provisions as a basis for granting em-
ployer motions for summary judgment.226
The reasoning of these courts is that an employee's acceptance of the
219. Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 120.
220. Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, Ltd., 555 A.2d 12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989);
Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio CL App. 1984).
221. 555 A.2d 12 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1989).
222. IdL at 13.
223. Id at 13-14, 16.
224. Id at 16; see also Helle, 472 N.E.2d at 777 (finding that contemplated modification of
unilateral contract failed due to lack of "legally adequate notice"); In re Certified Question (Bankey
v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Mich. 1989):
Fairness suggests that a discharge-for-cause policy announced with flourishes and fanfare
at noonday should not be revoked by a pennywhistle trill at midnight. We hold that for the
revocation of a discharge-for-cause policy to become legally effective, reasonable notice of
the change must be uniformly given to affected employees.
225. Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D.S.C. 1989); Thompson v. Kings En-
tertainment Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (E.D. Va. 1987); Towns v. Emery Air Freight, Inc., 3
Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 911, 913-14 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
226. Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1235-36; Thompson, 674 F. Supp. at 1198-99; Towns, 3 Indiv. Empl.
Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 914.
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revised handbook terms cannot be inferred merely from the employee's
continuing to work.227 Because the employee already possesses contrac-
tual rights flowing from the initial handbook,225 the employer cannot
unilaterally extinguish these rights simply by issuing a new handbook.229
Instead, the modification is effective only if it satisfies the elements for a
new bilateral contract, including mutual assent and sufficient considera-
tion.230 While the determination as to assent is a question of fact for the
jury,231 all three opinions suggest that satisfying the consideration ele-
ment requires the employer to provide new or additional benefits in re-
turn for the modification.232
Once again, a strict contractual approach provides a less than opti-
mal analytical framework. The pro-modification courts pile fiction upon
fiction in implying a revised unilateral contract based on the new hand-
book. These courts' conclusion that an employee's continued work per-
formance provides both acceptance and consideration is counter-intuitive
where the employee loses rather than gains rights.233 Since the employer
is the party benefiting from the modification, it is the employer rather
than the employee who should provide the necessary consideration. On
the other hand, the anti-modification courts fail to explain why a unilat-
eral contract approach is sufficient to establish enforceable handbook
rights but a bilateral approach is necessary to effect a revision of these
rights.
The Michigan Supreme Court in the Bankey234 decision discussed
above expressly rejected unilateral contract analysis in addressing the
modification issue. 235 The Bankey court explained that handbook provi-
sions are "not enforceable because they have been 'offered and accepted'
as a unilateral contract," but because of the benefit the employer derives
227. See, eg., Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1236; Thompson, 674 F. Supp. at 1198-99.
228. See, eg., Towns, 3 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 914 n.3; Pratt, supra note 16, at 221.
229. See, eg., Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1235 ("If an employer were permitted to extinguish an
employee's rights under an existing handbook through the simple expedient of a revised handbook,
employees could suffer the very inequities the [courts recognizing the handbook exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine] sought to prevent.").
230. Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1235-36; Thompson, 674 F. Supp. at 1198; see also Pratt, supra note
16, at 219-21, 224 (arguing that decisions permitting modification without mutual assent and ade-
quate consideration are inconsistent with general contract law principles).
231. Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1236; Thompson, 674 F. Supp. at 1198. The Thompson court ex-
plained that "[t]o establish acceptance under the contractual analysis, [the employer] must demon-
strate that [the employee] was aware of the new Handbook, that he understood that its terms
governed his employment, and that he worked according to those terms." 674 F. Supp. at 1198.
232. Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1236; Thompson, 674 F. Supp. at 1198 n.7; Towns, 3 Indiv. Empl.
Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 914 n.3.
233. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
234. In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich.
1989). The Bankey decision is discussed supra at notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
235. Id. at 119.
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by establishing such policies.2 36 Based on this analysis, the court ruled
that an employer may unilaterally withdraw promissory handbook lan-
guage because "the employer's benefit is correspondingly extin-
guished." '23 7 Thus, according to the Bankey court, an employer may
effect a unilateral modification if it eliminates the source of both the em-
ployer's benefit and the employee's expectations.
However, the Bankey court did not address the situation in which
the employer unilaterally modifies the handbook by adding a disclaimer
yet retains the promissory statements. Here, the Michigan court would
presumably find a question of fact concerning the disclaimer's impact.
By retaining the initial handbook language, the employer may not have
extinguished either the potential benefit to itself or the reasonable expec-
tations of its work force. The addition of a disclaimer may simply repre-
sent an attempt to preserve the benefits without paying the price. Under
the Bankey court's analysis, this situation would seem to require a fac-
tual determination by the jury as to whether the revised handbook, when
taken as a whole, continues to provide a benefit to the employer and is,
for that reason, enforceable.
The Bankey court's approach is better adapted to the problem of
handbook modifications. It does not attempt to mold fact situations to
mesh with the technicalities of unilateral contract analysis. It does not
change the rules of the game depending upon which party is seeking con-
tract enforcement. Instead, the Bankey approach tests the modification
issue by the same principles that give rise to the handbook obligation in
the first place. More significantly, the Bankey decision points the way to
a revised policy-oriented analysis of the broader issue of handbook
disclaimers.
c. Restrictions Arising From Extraneous Evidence
The parol evidence rule generally bars admission of prior or contem-
poraneous evidence to contradict the terms of an integrated contract.238
With regard to employee handbooks, courts sometimes invoke the parol
evidence rule as a basis for excluding evidence that is inconsistent with
the terms of a disclaimer.239
In contrast, other courts rely on extraneous evidence to limit the
legal effect of disclaimers in handbooks or job applications. Courts fre-
quently take this approach when a case includes evidence arising after
the issuance of the disclaimer that may serve as a modification of the at-
236. Id
237. Id
238. See E. ALLAN FARNswORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 7.2 (2d ed. 1990).
239. See, eg., Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (Ct.
App. 1986); Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 757, 761 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), cert
denied, 550 A.2d 450 (NJ. 1988).
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will agreement.2 ° When such inconsistent evidence exists, courts often
deny dispositive effect to the disclaimer and submit the broader enforce-
ment issue to the jury.
Courts find extraneous evidence in various sources. A written241 or
oral2 4 2 statement promising some sort of job security and made sometime
after the disclaimer is a prime example. Thus, in Helle v. Landmark,
Inc.,243 the employer issued a personnel manual that contained a detailed
severance plan describing benefits payable upon a plant closure or mass
layoff. When a closure actually occurred, the employer defended its re-
duced severance payments based on the terms of two disclaimer provi-
sions that provided for discretionary payments and unilateral
amendments, respectively. 2' The employees countered with evidence of
oral assurances that the employer would abide by the severance plan for
employees who did not quit early, during the swirl of rumors of an immi-
nent plant closure.2 45 The trial court granted summary judgment for the
employer, but an Ohio court of appeals reversed, stating:
[T]o the extent that the oral assurances of severance pay conflicted with
the manual's disclaimers, or induced appellants to disregard their signifi-
cance, we hold that such representations will negate the effect of dis-
claimers which are intended to absolve the employer from liability for
unilateral alterations of or deviations from policies presented in the writ-
ten manual or similar writings. 2 6
A growing number of courts have now taken the position that the
effect of a disclaimer should be evaluated in light of all the circum-
stances. 247 This is a very significant limitation on the usefulness of dis-
240. See, eg., Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805, 810 (D. Colo. 1983);
Rodie v. Max Factor & Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (Ct. App. 1989). But ef Bratton v. Menard, Inc.,
438 N.W.2d 116, 117-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (finding offer to modify at-will status in handbook
issued prior to execution of agreement containing disclaimer).
241. See Brooks, 574 F. Supp. at 806, 810; Bratton, 438 N.W.2d at 117-18; Butzer v. Camelot
Hall Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 454 N.W.2d 122, 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Swanson v. Liquid Air
Corp., 781 P.2d 900 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Wis. 1985).
242. See Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189 n.2 (Ct. App. 1989); Rodie,
256 Cal. Rptr. at 4; Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 849 (Kan. 1987); Schipani v. Ford Motor
Co., 302 N.W.2d 307, 310-11 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765, 775
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
243. 472 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
244. Id at 774.
245. Id. at 769-71, 774.
246. Ia at 775. Because of the oral modification possibility, some commentators advise employ-
ers to include a clause in the disclaimer which specifically limits the number of persons with author-
ity to alter the terms of the employment agreement. See, eg., Chagares, supra note 33, at 393-94.
Even this strategy is not always successful, however. See, eg., Seehawer v. Magnecraft Elec. Co.,
714 F. Supp. 910, 912, 914-15 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
247. See, eg., Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1476-77 (10th Cir. 1988); Wilkerson v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189, 191 (Ct. App. 1989); Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d
841, 849 (Kan. 1987); McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 791 P.2d 452, 457 (N.M. 1990); Tiranno v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 472 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (App. Div. 1984); Johnson v. Nasca, 802 P.2d 1294,
1297 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990); Badgett v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 322,
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claimers. Under this standard, handbook enforcement becomes a matter
for determination by the jury if the employee submits any evidence in-
consistent with the terms of the disclaimer.
For example, the Kansas Supreme Court held in Morriss v. Coleman
Co.24 that a handbook disclaimer did not, by itself, warrant a grant of
summary judgment for the employer. Instead, according to this court,
the handbook enforcement issue should be resolved by the jury based on
all the evidence:
The disclaimer in the supervisor's manual quoted above does not as a
matter of law determine the issue. It has not been established that the
disclaimer was brought to the personal attention of its employees or that
it was intended by Coleman to create an unqualified employment-at-will
relationship, especially in view of other provisions in the manual and the
statements made by Coleman's supervisors to the employees .... The
ultimate decision of whether there was an implied contract not to termi-
nate the plaintiffs without just cause must be determined from all the
evidence presented by the parties on that issue.249
Similarly, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled in McGinnis v. Honey-
well, Inc. that a disclaimer must be construed with reference to the par-
ties' "norms of conduct and expectations founded upon them."25 In
spite of a clear and unambiguous disclaimer, the New Mexico court in
McGinnis affirmed a jury award for the discharged employee, citing the
employer's "policy to take uniform and consistent actions regarding ter-
mination" and the fact that "supervisors were required to follow applica-
ble policies."25'
d. Substantive Limitations
The cases discussed above clearly exhibit a discomfort with dis-
claimers. But they do so indirectly. The approach taken by these courts
stretches the boundaries of conventional contract formation defenses in
situations where enforcement of a disclaimer would lead to inequitable
results.
A growing number of recent decisions take a more direct approach.
The courts in these cases, although relying on different rationales,
squarely confront the equities of handbook enforcement and recognize
substantive limitations on the legal effect of disclaimers.
324 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); see also Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1200 (5th Cir.
1987) (declining to enforce disclaimer where evidence established that supervisors and employees
understood that handbook provisions concerning job security were binding and engaged in course of
conduct consistent with that understanding).
248. 738 P.2d 841 (Kan. 1987).
249. Id. at 849.
250. 791 P.2d 452, 457 (N.M. 1990) (quoting Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1476-77
(10th Cir. 1988) and Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
251. 791 P.2d at 457.
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These decisions represent a significant and positive development in
the law of employee handbooks. The courts in these cases recognize that
the proper legal impact of a disclaimer can be ascertained only by refer-
ence to the language of a handbook read as a whole. Thus, a conspicuous
disclaimer in the context of indefinite language may simply underscore
the handbook's non-promissory nature. On the other hand, a handbook
that contains both a clear promise and a disclaimer is inherently ambigu-
ous. The cases discussed below appropriately recognize that it is the role
of the jury, rather than that of the court, to resolve this ambiguity. In
doing so, these decisions pave the way for a revised, policy-oriented
framework for the analysis of handbook disclaimers.
(1) Inherent Fact Question
At least two cases have taken the position that an inherent question
of fact exists if a handbook contains both promissory language and a
disclaimer.252 Under this approach, the court does not enforce the dis-
claimer as a matter of law, but instead asks the jury to resolve the ambi-
guity that results from the inconsistent representations.
A 1989 federal court decision illustrates the approach. In Seehawer
v. Magnecraft Electric Co.,253 the employer issued an employee handbook
that explicitly stated that "[e]mployees shall be discharged or disciplined
only for just cause."' 254 The handbook also established a grievance proce-
dure for resolving employee-management disputes. 255 At the same time
that the handbook was issued, the employer required employees to sign
statements acknowledging the at-will nature of the employment relation-
ship.25 6 An employee subsequently sought to enforce the handbook
statements in a suit challenging her dismissal after nineteen years with
the company. The employer moved for summary judgment and relied on
the disclaimer, but the federal court declined to grant the motion,
explaining:
We are faced with two simultaneously and seemingly conflicting "offers"
to Seehawer. The Manual, upon which Seehawer primarily relies in op-
position to summary judgment, promises termination only for just cause.
252. See Seehawer v. Magnecraft Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. IM. 1989); Dalton v. Her-
bruck Egg Sales Corp., 417 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). Two other decisions have adopted
similar positions: see also Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1476-77 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding a
handbook disclaimer insufficient to justify summary judgment; it must be read in reference to the
parties' norms of conduct and expectations founded upon them); Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank,
261 Cal. Rptr. 185, 191 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding that disclaimer in handbook which is not reduced to
integrated at-will agreement will not support summary judgment for employer on implied contract
claim, but is one of the factors for the jury to consider in determining the existence and content of
the employment agreement).
253. 714 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. II. 1989).
254. Id. at 912.
255. Id.
256. Id
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS
The Statement, upon which defendants rely in support of summary judg-
ment, appears to disclaim any such promise .... [Tihis apparent inconsis-
tency precludes summary judgment .... [T]o the extent that the
provisions are irreconcilable on their face, the clarification of ambiguities
in contractual provision is a matter best left to the trier of fact.257
The Seehawer approach represents a significant restriction on the
efficacy of handbook disclaimers. In this group of cases, the courts refuse
to enforce disclaimers as a matter of law even if the disclaiming language
is clear and no extraneous evidence is offered to contradict the dis-
claimer. As these courts analyze the situation, the ambiguity that inhib-
its disclaimer enforcement arises from the handbook itself. The Seehawer
approach recognizes that a handbook that contains both promises of job
security and a disclaimer that attempts to negate involuntary enforce-
ment of these promises is inherently ambiguous. As with any contractual
ambiguity, resolution is assigned to the jury. The jury's task is to weigh
the "conflicting offers" and determine whether the terms of the entire
handbook establish a binding contractual obligation.258
(2) Promissory Estoppel
Three other courts have reached the same result by relying on no-
tions of promissory estoppel.25 9 These courts conclude that the presence
of a disclaimer, although possibly sufficient to defeat formation of a uni-
lateral contract, does not foreclose the possibility of handbook enforce-
ment on the basis of promissory estoppel. Under this approach, a
disclaimer does not warrant a grant of summary judgment for the em-
ployer, but is merely one piece of evidence for a jury to consider in deter-
mining whether the handbook, taken as a whole, reasonably induced the
work force to rely on its terms.2"
The Wyoming Supreme Court provided the best articulation of this
theory in its 1990 decision, McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc.261
In this case, the employer distributed an employee handbook containing
a "fair treatment" procedure which guaranteed employees the opportu-
257. Id. at 914-15.
258. See Dalton v. Herbruck Egg Sales Corp., 417 N.W.2d 496, 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987):
The tenor of the entire handbook is that all employees will be fairly and justly treated in
accordance with the procedures set forth in the handbook. Where a policy manual pro-
vides both a "for cause" termination policy and a terminable at will policy, the question
whether an employment contract with a just cause termination policy has been formed is a
question of fact to be resolved by the jury.
259. See, e.g., Allabashi v. Lincoln Nat'1 Sales Corp., 824 P.2d I (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Cronk
v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. CL App. 1988); Haselrig v. Public Storage
Inc., 585 A.2d 294 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1991); McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d
866 (Wyo. 1990), remanded, 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991).
260. See, e.g., Allabashi, 824 P.2d at 2; Cronk, 765 P.2d at 623-24; Haselrig, 585 A.2d at 300;
McDonald, 789 P.2d at 869-70.
261. 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990).
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nity to be heard on any problem without fear of reprisal.2 62 The hand-
book also set out a list of inappropriate behaviors and a five-step
disciplinary process.26 3 The trial court, although noting that the tenor of
the handbook was that of an employment contract, held that the em-
ployer's inclusion of a disclaimer in the handbook defeated the dis-
charged employee's contract claim.2" The state Supreme Court
reversed, with the five justices authoring four opinions. The plurality
agreed that the disclaimer precluded the employee's claim of a unilateral
contract.2 6 5 This conclusion did not end the analysis, however. The
opinion went on to explain that the handbook language "could be under-
stood to connote promises" that might be enforceable even in the absence
of a contractual obligation.26 6 The plurality found that, even with the
disclaimer, the handbook promises could be enforced under a theory of
promissory estoppel.26 7 According to the plurality, an employee is enti-
tled to enforce a handbook promise, notwithstanding an accompanying
disclaimer, if it can be shown that:
(1) The employer should have reasonably expected the employee to con-
sider the representation as a commitment from the employer; (2) the em-
ployee reasonably relied upon the representation to his detriment; and (3)
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of representation.2 68
These issues, the plurality concluded, were a matter for the jury to deter-
mine and warranted reversal of the trial court's summary judgment
order.
269
Like the "conflicting offer" logic of Seehawer,2 7 ° the McDonald ap-
proach transforms the disclaimer issue from one of law to one of fact.
262. Id. at 868.
263. Id.
264. Id. The employer added the disclaimer following a 1985 decision that held that the Mobil
Coal Producing handbook constituted an employment contract. See Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v.
Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 706-07 (Wyo. 1985). The two dissenting opinions in McDonald chided the
majority for changing the rules of the game after Mobil followed the Supreme Court's advice and
added the disclaimer. 789 P.2d at 871 (Cardine, C.J., dissenting), 872 (Thomas, J., dissenting),
remanded, 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991).
265. Id. at 869.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 869-70.
268. Id. at 870.
269. Id. at 870. The third and deciding vote for the majority result in McDonald was premised
on a different theory. Justice Golden, in a concurring opinion, applied unilateral contract rather
than promissory estoppel principles in finding that the disclaimer was not sufficiently conspicuous to
justify summary judgment. 789 P.2d at 870-71 (Golden, 3., concurring). Based on reasoning similar
to Seehawer (see supra notes 252-58 and accompanying text), Justice Golden found that the inconsis-
tent representations contained in the handbook provisions describing job security on the one hand,
and those asserted in the disclaimer on the other, created an ambiguity requiring submission to the
jury. 789 P.2d at 871. Two dissenting justices would have enforced the disclaimer and affirmed the
grant of summary judgment for the employer. 789 P.2d at 871 (Cardine, C.J., dissenting), 789 P.2d
at 872 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
270. The Seehawer case is discussed supra at notes 252-58 and accompanying text.
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What differentiates the two cases is their underlying theories. Seehawer
is grounded in unilateral contract principles, while the McDonald plural-
ity relies on promissory estoppel.27 1 The Seehawer approach asks the
jury to resolve the ambiguity resulting from inconsistent handbook repre-
sentations, while the promissory estoppel approach frames the question
in terms of the employees' reasonable expectations. But the result is es-
sentially the same. The disclaimer is reduced in significance from the
determinative factor that automatically precludes handbook enforcement
to just one of the factors for the jury to consider in resolving the question
of handbook enforcement.
(3) Detailed or Unequivocal Handbook Language
Finally, two other cases have denied enforcement to disclaimers be-
cause of explicit and detailed promissory language contained elsewhere
in the handbook.272 The courts in these cases found that the promissory
language simply overrode the disclaimer. These cases go beyond the two
preceding groups of cases in that, in this category, each court ruled as a
matter of law that the handbook created enforceable job security rights
regardless of the disclaimer.
In Jones v. Central Peninsula General Hospital,273 the hospital pro-
vided its employees with a detailed, eighty-five page personnel manual.
The manual described a policy of termination for cause coupled with a
detailed grievance procedure. Marge Jones, a registered nurse at the hos-
pital, invoked the handbook provisions in challenging her dismissal. The
hospital argued that the handbook did not modify the at-will presump-
tion because it contained a disclaimer of contract status. The Alaska
Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the one-sentence dis-
claimer was followed by eighty-five pages of detailed text.274 The court
explained that:
[t]he manual therefore creates the impression, contrary to the "dis-
claimer," that employees are to be provided with certain job protections.
Employers should not be allowed to "instill... reasonable expectations
of job security" in employees, and then withdraw the basis for those ex-
pectations when the employee's performance is no longer desired. We
therefore conclude that the disclaimer contained in the 1978 manual does
not prevent the provisions of the manual from becoming part of, and thus
271. Compare Seehawer v. Magnecraft Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 910, 914-15 (N.D. IMI. 1989) with
McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 869-70 (Wyo. 1990).
272. A third case adopted a very similar position. See Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d
1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1987) (declining to enforce disclaimer because of detailed handbook provisions
establishing a policy of termination only for good cause and a grievance procedure; plus evidence
that supervisors and employees understood that such policies were binding on all concerned).
273. 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989).
274. Id at 787-88.
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modifying, Jones' at-will employment agreement .... 275
Rather than simply reversing the lower court's grant of summary
judgment to the employer and remanding the handbook enforcement is-
sue to the jury, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled as a matter of law that
the personnel manual created a binding policy of termination for cause.
The only issue remaining for the jury on remand, then, was whether the
discharge of Marge Jones had actually complied with this policy.
2 7 6
An Illinois appellate court followed a similar approach in Perman v.
ArcVentures, Inc.2 7 7 In this case, an employee was given a detailed hand-
book that contained a code of conduct, disciplinary rules, and a griev-
ance procedure.278 The handbook also contained a disclaimer that
reserved the right to modify policies and to terminate or discipline em-
ployees.2 79 Despite this disclaimer, the court found as a matter of law
that the discharged employee possessed enforceable rights in the hand-
book procedures:
[W]e find that the language in Rush's manual of personnel policies and
procedures created enforceable contractual rights despite its disclaimer.
... Given the unequivocal language [of the handbook], we reverse
the trial court's summary judgment ruling and find as a matter of law
that Perman's employment could not be terminated at-will insofar as the
manual provided for an established grievance procedure for an unfavora-
ble decision affecting employment.28 0
Thus, the conclusion reached by the Jones and Perman courts is that
detailed or unequivocal handbook promises will prevail over disclaimers.
The essential methodology of these decisions involves comparing the im-
pact of the promissory statements and that of the countervailing dis-
claiming language. If the promissory statements are so explicit as to
create legitimate expectations among the work force, despite the presence
of a disclaimer, the court will enforce the handbook statements. The key
difference from the cases discussed in the two preceding sections is that,
in Jones and Perman, the court itself undertakes this comparison. In-
stead of simply finding an evidentiary conflict between the promissory
statements and the disclaimer, which would require submitting the issue
to a jury, these decisions find the balance tilted so heavily as to permit the
court to nullify the disclaimer as a matter of law.
275. Id. (citations omitted).
276. Id. at 788-89.
277. 554 N.E.2d 982 (Ili. App. CL 1990).
278. Id at 985.
279. Id
280. Id at 987. The Perman court went on to conclude, however, that the employer had com-
plied with the handbook grievance procedures and that the termination was supported by just cause.
Id at 987-88.
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III.
THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. Explaining the Gap
The cases discussed above reveal a significant gap between theory
and practice. Many of the leading handbook decisions suggest that, in
theory, disclaimers can defeat enforcement of handbook statements.
28
'
But, in practice, courts frequently search for reasons to reach just the
opposite result. As this article illustrates, no fewer than forty-five re-
ported decisions over the past decade have declined to give effect to
handbook disclaimers.28 2
The gap has its origins on both sides of the theory/practice equa-
tion, though the factors leading to divergence are probably more obvious
on the side of practice. Courts often refuse to give effect to disclaimers,
regardless of theory, when doing so would lead to inequitable results.
Indeed, considerations of fairness, although typically unstated, explain
the outcome of most handbook cases. Where handbooks make no
promises of job security or contain only vague statements of policy,
courts have little difficulty adhering to theory and enforcing the terms of
disclaimers.283 But where handbooks make explicit promises or other-
wise foster reasonable employee expectations, courts tend to downplay
theory and find reasons to require jury consideration of the handbook
provisions as a whole.28 4
The criterion of fairness flows from the same policy considerations
as those underlying handbook enforcement itself.285 To the extent that a
handbook describes personnel policies that facilitate greater productivity,
the employer benefits from the distribution of the handbook even if it
contains a statement disclaiming contractual liability. Similarly, a dis-
claimer may not eliminate legitimate employee expectations of job secur-
ity when the tenor of the entire handbook is taken into account. It is one
thing for courts to deny handbook claims where a disclaimer underscores
that non-promissory statements do not give rise to contractual rights. It
is quite another to permit an employer to reap the benefits of a handbook
by making explicit representations of job security, while also allowing the
employer to avoid complying with these representations merely by in-
281. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
282. These cases are listed in the Appendix infra at 000-00.
283. See eg., Arnold v. Diet Ctr., Inc., 746 P.2d 1040 (Idaho 1987) (enforcing disclaimer where
employer read it to employee at time of hiring and had employee sign cover page including dis-
claimer); Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that handbook reciting company policy of trying to provide permanent work
insufficient to alter employees' at-will status).
284. See supra notes 252-58 and accompanying text.
285. The policy considerations underlying handbook enforcement are discussed supra notes 76-
90 and accompanying text.
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cluding a disclaimer. As observed in a number of recent opinions, the
latter situation is the quintessence of having one's cake and eating it
too.
286
The theoretical component also contributes to the existence of the
gap between theory and practice in the disclaimer cases. Here, the prob-
lem lies with the prevailing mode of analysis, grounded in the doctrine of
unilateral contract. As discussed above,287 unilateral contract theory of-
fers a convenient fiction for the enforcement of handbook statements.
The unilateral contract approach is convenient because it offers an ac-
ceptable vehicle for reaching the desirable policy end of enforcing prom-
issory handbook terms. It accomplishes this by providing the theoretical
framework for finding a binding contract in the absence of an express
agreement. According to unilateral contract analysis, the handbook con-
stitutes an implied offer which is accepted and rendered enforceable by
an employee's continued performance of work.288
No matter how convenient, unilateral contract analysis in the hand-
book setting still relies heavily on fiction. It is a fiction to conclude that
an employer intends to make a contractual offer by issuing an employee
handbook. It is also a fiction to conclude that employees intend to accept
revised employment terms by showing up for work as usual the day after
the handbook is distributed. The result accomplished by applying unilat-
eral contract principles to handbook statements may be just, but the
analysis is inescapably entangled with fiction.
When unilateral contract analysis is extended to the disclaimer con-
text, the fiction is compounded. Under unilateral contract theory, a dis-
claimer is effective because it dispels the existence of an offer.28 9 When
an employer prints a statement disclaiming that a handbook constitutes a
contractual offer, the implied offer essential to unilateral contract forma-
286. See, eg., Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1989):
The manual therefore creates the impression, contrary to the 'disclaimer,' that employees
are to be provided with certain job protections. Employers should not be allowed to 'instill
... reasonable expectations of job security' in employees, and then withdraw the basis for
those expectations when the employee's performance is no longer desired.
See also Thompson v. King's Entertainment Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (E.D. Va. 1987) ("Em-
ployers should be bound by their expressed policies to preclude their offering with one hand what
[they] take away with the other."); Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 417
N.W.2d 797, 801 (N.D. 1987) (Meschke, J., dissenting) ("There are evident issues of fact about the
'ambiguity and reliance created by an employer's disclaimer in an employee handbook that purports
to "taketh" what the remainder of the handbook appears to "giveth."' " (quoting Bailey v. Perkins
Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Levine, J., concurring) (N.D. 1986))).
257. See supra notes 93-115 and accompanying text.
288. The requisite elements of unilateral contract formation with respect to employee hand-
books are discussed supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
289. See Anders v. Mobil Chem. Co., 559 N.E.2d 1119, 1122 (Ill. App. Ct.) (holding that ex-
plicit disclaimer precluded employee from reasonably believing an offer had been made), appeal
denied, 564 N.E.2d 834 (Ill. 1990); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J.
1985) (holding that with a disclaimer, employer promises nothing).
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tion disappears. A simple formalistic statement defeats enforcement of
the entire handbook. One fiction defeats another. Meanwhile, however,
the underlying policy concerns are left unaddressed. In reality, the pol-
icy considerations that support handbook enforcement remain relevant
even if the handbook includes a disclaimer. The handbook, taken as a
whole, may still convey representations that yield benefits for the em-
ployer and instill expectations among the work force. But there is no
room for these crucial policy concerns to come into play under the tradi-
tional unilateral contract approach. As a result, the fiction involved in
applying unilateral contract analysis loses its convenience when a court's
focus shifts to the effect of disclaimers.
Much like the application of unilateral contract analysis, the tradi-
tional promissory estoppel basis for handbook enforcement depends on a
fiction to the extent that the doctrine requires proof of individualized
reliance. The courts have indulged in a fiction in finding that an em-
ployee's continued performance of work satisfies this reliance element.290
And as in the unilateral contract approach, resorting to the fiction under-
cuts consideration of relevant policy concerns when a disclaimer is con-
strued as automatically negating the appropriateness of the reliance that
the doctrine requires of the affected employee.
The poor fit between existing theoretical models and the issue of
handbook disclaimers produces discordance between theory and prac-
tice.291 Under the prevailing theories, disclaimers are effective to defeat
handbook enforcement without regard to underlying policy considera-
tions. In practice, however, courts frequently refuse to enforce disclaim-
ers because of the very policy considerations that the theoretical
framework ignores. Except for a few pioneering courts that are now in-
voking substantive objections to the automatic enforcement of disclaim-
ers,2 92 courts generally rely on a certain amount of disingenuousness to
reach their practical results. Instead of directly discussing-the equities of
disclaimer enforcement, most decisions in this area have stretched con-
ventional contract analysis to find ambiguities or extraneous evidence
sufficient to warrant jury consideration of the issue. In short, most
courts continue to give lip service to the theory, but refuse to be con-
strained by its limitations when necessary to prevent fundamental
unfairness.
B. Bridging the Gap
The gap between theory and practice should be closed. The fiction
290. The promissory estoppel basis for handbook enforcement is discussed supra at notes 116-29
and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 281-90 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 252-80 and accompanying text.
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of the unilateral contract approach compels courts to resort to covert
devices to avoid unfair results. Unfortunately, this situation confirms the
observations of Karl Llewellyn, principal architect of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: "[C]overt tools are never reliable tools. ' 29 3 While manip-
ulation of conventional doctrines may produce justice in individual cases,
the overall result is unpredictability and confusion.
The appropriate response of the legal system to the gap between the-
ory and practice is to revise current theory to incorporate the policy con-
siderations that have played such a significant, though often covert, role
in many recent handbook decisions.294 Bringing the underlying princi-
ples into the open can reduce the obscurity of much existing disclaimer
analysis, thus leading to better-grounded, more consistent case law.
Some commentators suggest that handbook disclaimers are inher-
ently unfair and should be found unenforceable as a matter of law.2 95
These critics contend that disclaimers are typically boilerplate clauses
that employers impose without bargaining and that employees do not
understand.296 While this is often the case, the argument misses the
293. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMoN LAW TRADrTION 365 (1960) (quoting Karl N.
Llewellyn, Book Review, HARv. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939)).
294. An adjustment of this nature was undertaken in the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The Code's drafters recognized that a similar gap between theory and practice existed with
respect to the enforcement of oppressive or unfair contract provisions. Because freedom of contract
notions prevailed during the first half of this century, the courts resorted to indirect flanking tech-
niques to negate the offending clauses. The U.C.C. drafters responded by modifying the theoretical
perspective so as to recognize "unconscionability" as a legitimate defense to contract enforcement.
The official comment to the resulting § 2-302 explained the purpose of this provision as follows:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the
contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the past such policing has
been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of
offer and acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to
the dominant purpose of the contract. This section is intended to allow the court to pass
directly on the unconscionability of the contract ....
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1990); see also Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Em-
peror's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 525-27 (1967) (criticizing § 2-302 and cmt. 1 for em-
powering courts to give "no reason at all" for voiding contracts as unconscionable); Note,
Unconscionable Contracts" The Uniform Commercial Code, 45 IowA L. REv. 843, 844-46 (1960)
(stating that § 2-302 will allow courts to mount a "long-overdue assault on the citadel of freedom of
contract.").
295. See, eg., Steiner & Dabrow, supra note 172, at 642 (arguing that disclaimers may be un-
conscionable if construed as adhesion contracts); Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment
and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1082, 1106-07 (1984) (arguing that courts should not hesitate in holding contract provisions
unenforceable as a matter of public policy; disclaimers should be subject to close scrutiny). See also
Note, Unjust Dismissal of Employees at WilL" Are Disclaimers a Final Solution?, 15 FORDHAM UR.
L.J. 533, 564 (1987) (arguing that judicial support for handbook disclaimers discourages an employ-
ment relationship based on principles of fairness and equal treatment).
296. See generally Finkin, supra note 21, at 750 (stating that judicial enforcement of a boiler-
plate disclaimer "comes close to deference to a fraud"); Summers, supra note 295, at 1106-07 (noting
that the potential for overreaching is pervasive in standardized employment contracts, particularly
since employees may not recognize the full import of disclaimer clauses incorporated by reference).
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mark for two reasons.297 First, disclaimers are not always unfair. In
some instances, a disclaimer represents part of a conscious bargain be-
tween employer and employee. More frequently, the disclaimer simply
underscores that the particular handbook makes no promises of job se-
curity. This leads to the second point: the fairness of a handbook dis-
claimer cannot be ascertained without reference to the rest of the
handbook. That is, the question of whether a disclaimer fairly dispels
expectations created by handbook statements can be answered only by an
evaluation of the entire handbook. Ultimately, then, the appropriateness
of giving effect to disclaimers depends on whether the handbook as a
whole warrants legal enforcement.
The most appropriate way to bridge the gap between theory and
practice, accordingly, is to adopt a revised theoretical framework that
reflects the policy considerations underlying the enforcement of hand-
book statements. More specifically, handbook language, including dis-
claimers, should be evaluated with reference to the ultimate policy reason
for enforcing handbook promises: the benefits that an employer derives
by creating employee expectations of job security.
A number of recent developments appear to signal the emergence of
such an approach. As discussed above, both the Farber and Matheson
study298 and the Michigan Supreme Court's Bankey decision29 9 urge
adoption of a modified promissory estoppel standard grounded in the rel-
evant policy considerations. In addition, this article describes a signifi-
cant and growing number of decisions that have recognized substantive
limitations on the enforcement of disclaimers."o° The Wyoming Supreme
Court's McDonald decision, in particular, has stated these limitations in
terms of a policy-oriented, promissory estoppel rationale.30 1
Taken together, these sources suggest the appropriate formula for
both handbook and disclaimer analysis. The Farber and Matheson arti-
297. Thus far, the "adhesion contract" argument has been roundly rejected by the courts. See
eg., Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Anders v.
Mobil Chem. Co., 559 N.E.2d 1119, 1123-25 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 834 (Ill.
1990); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 517 A.2d 786, 794 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986), cerL
denied, 523 A.2d 1013 (Md. 1987). One of the principal rejoinders to this argument is that disclaim-
ers cannot be viewed as inherently unfair since they serve only to leave employees in the same at-will
position as the law presumes in the first place. See Anders, 559 N.E.2d at 1124; Chagares, supra note
33, at 379-80. While I agree that handbook disclaimers should not be rejected automatically, this
response seems to miss the point of the anti-disclaimer argument. To the extent that a disclaimer
coexists in a handbook with promissory language, the disclaimer does not just preserve the status
quo of the at-will presumption. Instead, it secures this status by negating contractual rights to job
security that, but for the disclaimer, would exist by virtue of the handbook promises.
298. The Farber & Matheson study is discussed supra at notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
299. In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich.
1989). The Bankey decision is discussed supra at notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 252-80 and accompanying text.
301. See McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990), remanded, 820
P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991). The decision is discussed supra at notes 261-71 and accompanying text.
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cle clarifies that the exchange initiated by the distribution of an employee
handbook occurs, not as the specific transaction envisioned by unilateral
contract analysis, but in the context of an ongoing economic relationship
characterized by a need for confidence and trust.3 2 The quasi-fiduciary
nature of the employment relationship creates a context in which hand-
book promises may become "instinct with an obligation. '313 A hand-
book that contains promises that are credible and specific instills
reasonable expectations of fair treatment among the work force.3°
These expectations, in turn, promote what the Bankey court described as
"an environment conducive to collective productivity. '303 Finally, as the
McDonald court recognized, the entire handbook should be consulted in
determining the enforceability of handbook promises. Thus, even if the
handbook contains a disclaimer, its promissory statements should be en-
forced if the policy reasons that favor handbook enforcement still
predominate.30 6
C. The Proposed Test
The terms of an employee handbook, with or without a disclaimer,
should be enforced if the following three elements are present:
L A Specific Promise
Handbook statements should be binding on the employer only if
stated in a manner that may readily be understood as the expression of a
credible promise. Not every handbook term rises to this level. A mud-
dled or vague statement of general policy does not. Neither does lan-
guage that describes predominantly subjective or discretionary policies.
To be enforceable a handbook promise must be stated in language suffi-
ciently objective and specific to lead employees reasonably to believe that
the employer will abide by the expressed representation.30 7
2. Reasonable Employee Expectations
The promise, to be enforceable, must be conveyed in a context that
creates reasonable employee expectations concerning the employer's poli-
cies. To a certain extent, this is the traditional promissory estoppel re-
302. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 112, at 925-29.
303. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980).
304. See Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 787-88 (Alaska 1989); see also
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087-88 (Wash. 1984).
305. In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112, 119 (Mich.
1989).
306. McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 869-70 (Wyo. 1990), remanded,
820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991).
307. Decisions following a unilateral contract approach similarly require that handbook lan-
guage be "definite in form" to constitute an offer for a unilateral contract. See supra notes 107-09
and accompanying text.
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quirement of reasonable reliance. But in this analytic framework,
reliance relates to objectively based group expectations, rather than indi-
vidual expectations."' The enforcement of handbook promises should
not depend on proof that a particular employee actually read and relied
on a particular handbook provision. Instead, handbook promises, should
be enforced if they create an atmosphere in which the collective work
force legitimately expects that the employer will comply with its stated
policies.
3. Substantial Benefit to the Employer
The employee expectations or behavior induced by the handbook
promises should be capable of providing a potential benefit to the em-
ployer. This benefit need not be tangible or objectively demonstrable,
such as the hiring or retention of a particular, desirable employee. It is
enough, in the words of the Bankey court, if the handbook statements
facilitate "an environment conducive to collective productivity."30 9
To a great extent, these three factors describe a single phenomenon.
The promise is enforceable because of the resulting benefit to the em-
ployer. The element of reasonable expectation acts as the conduit from
promise to benefit. That is, the benefit occurs by virtue of the favorable
expectations created by the promise.
Nonetheless, the three-factor formula is desirable because a delinea-
tion of the three elements both helps to clarify which handbook state-
ments should be enforceable and highlights the reasons for their
enforcement. For example, handbook statements that contain only "feel
good" language may be marginally beneficial to an employer but fail to
instill a reasonable expectation of specific treatment. Such statements
would not pass muster under the proposed standard. Only those state-
ments that are sufficiently promissory in nature to create a legitimate
expectation of specific employer conduct should give rise to a binding
obligation.
So, how does the disclaimer fit into this analytical framework?
Under the proposed test, the disclaimer is merely one factor to consider
in ascertaining whether the handbook as a whole conveys credible
promises that should be enforced. Unlike the role assigned it under
traditional unilateral contract analysis, the disclaimer is not automati-
cally determinative of the enforcement issue. But neither is it to be disre-
garded. The disclaimer, which necessarily militates against enforcement,
should be weighed in the balance along with other handbook provisions.
308. The concept of collective rather than individual reliance is discussed supra at notes 127-29
and accompanying text.
309. Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 119.
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As in the Seehawer3 10 and McDonald31 1 cases discussed above, however,
a handbook that contains both promissory language and a disclaimer
should be viewed as inherently ambiguous. Thus, under the proposed
test, the entire handbook, including any disclaimer, should be considered
in determining whether the handbook gives rise to a promise, an expecta-
tion, and a benefit.
As with any question of fact, this is primarily a matter for the jury
to decide. The court should intervene to resolve the handbook issue as a
matter of law only if the handbook statements and the disclaimer, taken
together, establish beyond any doubt than an enforceable promise either
does or does not exist. The coexistence of specific promissory statements
with a disclaimer, however, necessarily precludes a grant of summary
judgment for the employer.
D. Application of the Proposed Test
The following examples illustrate the application of the proposed
test in three paradigm handbook settings.
1. Handbook Without a Disclaimer
When an employer distributes a handbook without a disclaimer, the
enforceability issue should be determined by the jury in terms of the pro-
posed three-factor test. The jury's task is to determine whether the hand-
book contains promises of specific treatment that give rise to reasonable
expectations among the work force and that facilitate a beneficial work
environment for the employer. Evidence beyond the handbook terms is
also relevant to establish the overall tenor of the employment relation-
ship. The court should remove the enforceability issue from the jury
only if no possible doubt exists as to the construction of the handbook
terms.
2. Handbook With a Disclaimer
The same general approach should be taken even if the handbook
contains a disclaimer.312 The relevant issue is still whether the hand-
book, even with a disclaimer, gives rise to a promise, an expectation, and
a benefit. If so, the handbook representations should be enforced despite
the disclaimer.31 3 The disclaimer, of course, weighs against enforcement
310. Seehawer v. Magnecraft Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Ill. 1989), is discussed supra at
notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
311. McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990), remanded, 820 P.2d
986 (Wyo. 1991), is discussed supra at notes 261-71 and accompanying text.
312. The reference to disclaimers is meant to include disclaiming language contained in docu-
ments other than a handbook, such as a separate at-will agreement.
313. See, eg., McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990), remanded,
820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991).
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and necessitates a greater amount of countervailing evidence than in the
preceding illustration.
The court should remove the enforcement issue from the jury's con-
sideration and decide it as a matter of law in only two situations. First,
the court should rule for the employer as a matter of law if the handbook
statements, when read with the disclaimer, could not possibly be inter-
preted in a promissory manner.3"4 Conversely, the court should rule for
the employee as a matter of law if, as in the Jones and Perman cases
discussed above,315 the handbook statements are so detailed or unequivo-
cal that, even with a disclaimer, they could not plausibly be interpreted
in a non-promissory manner.
3. Handbook Modification
A somewhat different question is posed when an employer attempts
to withdraw previously issued handbook statements promising job secur-
ity. The appropriate test, however, remains the same. The pertinent in-
quiry here concerns whether the reasons initially justifying handbook
enforcement still predominate. Thus, when an employer modifies its
handbook by eliminating promissory statements, the reasons for future
handbook enforcement also are eliminated. The withdrawal of the prom-
ise extinguishes both the employees' expectations and the employer's
benefit. Accordingly, handbook modification should be permissible, even
on a unilateral basis, if the employer also rescinds the source of its poten-
tial benefit.316
On the other hand, an employer's attempt to avoid liability merely
by adding a disclaimer may not be successful. If the handbook still con-
tains representations of job security, the addition of a disclaimer serves
only to raise a fact question concerning the promissory nature of the re-
vised handbook. The handbook will remain enforceable, even with the
newly added disclaimer, if the jury concludes that on balance, the entire
handbook continues to offer a credible promise of job security. The key
to the enforcement issue, then, is not the disclaimer, but the document's
overall tenor.
Of course, even if a revised handbook successfully limits future obli-
gations, an employer still may face liability for pre-existing obligations
that arose from the prior handbook language. In other words, while an
employer should be able to limit future liability by eliminating future
promises along with the benefits derived from those promises, it should
not be able to limit liability for past promises in the same manner. For
314. See, eg., Arnold v. Diet Ctr., Inc., 756 P.2d 1040 (Idaho 1987); Castiglione v. Johns Hop-
kins Hosp., 517 A.2d 786 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
315. See supra notes 272-80 and accompanying text.
316. See In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112, 119
(Mich. 1989).
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example, it seems clear that an employer cannot extinguish an em-
ployee's entitlement to benefits or compensation earned or accrued under
an explicit handbook policy merely by altering the policy terms on a ret-
roactive basis.3 7 Similarly, an employee who works for a considerable
period of time under an explicit job security policy may have some claim
to relief upon discharge without cause after a policy change in order to
avoid unjust enrichment. 3 8 As a separate opinion in the Bankey case
noted, the resolution of such issues necessarily depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case.3 9
E. Foreseeable Objections to the Proposed Test
Not everyone will approve of this proposed test. Employers particu-
larly will resist the suggested transfer of decision-making authority from
judges to juries. Three principal objections are likely.
First, critics undoubtedly will contend that jury trials are a slow and
costly mechanism for resolving disputes. While this contention has some
validity, it is hardly an objection unique to employment law. Trial by
jury necessarily is more burdensome than trial by summary judgment.
Yet our system of jurisprudence has long recognized the jury's para-
mount authority in resolving factual disputes.320 It surely would offend
our notions of fundamental fairness, not to mention the Seventh Amend-
ment 32' and its counterparts in the various state constitutions, to adopt a
blanket policy of awarding summary judgment to all defendants simply
because of the higher cost of jury trials.
What is unique to employment law, at least under traditional unilat-
eral contract analysis, is that the factual dispute posed by many employee
handbooks typically is withheld from jury deliberation.322 As discussed
317. See, e.g., Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765, 777 (Ohio 1984); Langdon v. Saga
Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
318. In his separate opinion in Bankey, Justice Levin agreed with the majority opinion in recog-
nizing an employer's ability to withdraw handbook promises, but he cautioned that some remedy
may nonetheless be appropriate with respect to legitimate expectations of job security that arose
before the policy change:
An employee who worked for a significant period of time under a discharge-for-cause pol-
icy before the change in policy to one of employment-at-will and is terminated without
cause after the change might be entitled to some relief or remedy in respect to legitimate
expectations of job security that arose during his employment under the discharge-for-
cause policy.
In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112, 122 (Mich. 1989)
(Levin, J., concurring).
319. Id.
320. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.3 (3d ed.
1985).
321. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n suits at common
law, where the value in the controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved."
322. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
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above,3 23 a handbook that contains both a promise and a disclaimer is
inherently ambiguous. By determining such cases through summary
judgment, the court is invading the appropriate province of the jury.
Perhaps more important, the summary judgment approach abridges fun-
damental fairness by automatically resolving this ambiguity in the em-
ployer's favor.
It is also important to recognize that even under the proposed test,
employers retain ultimate control over whether the handbook raises an
issue for the jury to resolve. A factual issue arises for the jury only if the
employer chooses to include in a handbook language promising job se-
curity. Thus, the proposed test required additional jury trials beyond
those previously necessary only where an employer attempts to have the
best of both worlds by disseminating contradictory statements that
promise job security but attempt to disclaim enforcement of that
promise.
In addition, an employer can preempt the jury's role by providing
for arbitration as the means of resolving disputes arising from the hand-
book. Since handbook enforcement flows from the terms expressed in
the handbook itself, an employer's selection of the specific forum for en-
forcement is likely to be sustained so long as the procedures described in
the handbook are fair and comport with general notions of due
process.324
A second likely objection to delegating disclaimer questions to the
jury concerns the possibility of inconsistent interpretations of the same
employee handbook. This problem could arise if juries in separate law-
suits examined identical handbook language but reached different results.
One possible means of avoiding this problem is to afford collateral estop-
pel effect to the determination that is first in time. This "offensive" use of
collateral estoppel, as the Supreme Court has indicated, should include
broad discretion in the trial court to avoid unfair results in individual
cases.
32 5
Finally, critics may argue that the proposed test will dissuade em-
ployers from issuing any handbooks whatsoever because of the increased
likelihood that the handbook terms will be found legally binding. This
result is undesirable, the critics will contend, because of the social utility
of expressing workplace policies in an employee handbook format.326
323. See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
324. See Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CH.-KENT
L. REv. 753, 770-71 (1990); Alfred G. Feliu, Legal Consequences of Nonunion Dispute-Resolution
Systems, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 83, 93 (1987).
325. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
326. Many courts have expressed the view that handbooks are desirable, not just for employers,
but for employees and society as a whole. See, eg., Fink v. Revco Discount Drug Ctrs., Inc., 666 F.
Supp. 1325, 1328 (W.D. Mo. 1987) ("[IThe attempt to regularize personnel practices through the use
of such handbooks is commendable"); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271
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A similar objection was raised a decade ago in reaction to those
court decisions that first held handbook statements to be enforceable. 27
Yet employee handbooks have not disappeared. The explanation is that
employers issue handbooks, not because of notions of social utility or
employee-directed benevolence, but because of the benefits they hope to
derive for themselves. 32 Therefore, the proposed test likely will not dis-
suade employers from distributing handbooks. Instead, it will simply
provide employers, as well as the courts, with a more realistic cost-benefit
framework for assessing the future impact of employee handbook
statements.
CONCLUSION
The employee handbook exception is a reaction to one of the contex-
tual inequities of the rule of employment-at-will. The exception grew out
of a recognition that employers should be bound by handbook statements
that seek to improve workplace productivity by instilling expectations of
job security and fair treatment. On a theoretical level, most courts rely
on unilateral contract principles to enforce handbook premises. These
courts invoke unilateral contract concepts to craft a convenient fiction in
which employee handbooks constitute offers that are accepted by an em-
ployee's continued performance of work.
Unilateral contract theory, however, also construes the disclaimer as
a complete defense to contract formation. Thus, an employer may cir-
cumvent the handbook exception merely by stating its intent not to be
bound by handbook representations. Coupled with the proselytizing ef-
forts of disclaimer industry experts, the disclaimer, at least in theory,
threatens to swallow the entire handbook exception.
But the theoretical primacy of the disclaimer has stumbled in work-
place realities. Many courts remain uncomfortable with the idea that a
simple boilerplate disclaimer automatically negates the binding nature of
handbook promises, no matter how detailed or how credible. These
courts, not surprisingly, search for ways to avoid disclaimer enforcement
where the outcome would be unfair. As this article describes, the courts
in at least forty-five decisions over the past decade have declined to dis-
positively enforce disclaimers.329 Some do so by finding substantive limi-
(N.J. 1985) ("Such manuals can be very helpful tools in labor relations, helpful to both employer and
employees.").
327. See, eg., Steefel, supra note 115, at 481.
328. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text; see also THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK, supra
note 75, at 225 (the potential benefits to an employer utilizing a handbook outweigh the resulting
risk of contractual liability); Coombe, supra note 58, at 10-13 (maintaining that employers should
continue to use employee handbooks, despite increased enforceability, because of the benefits they
derive from handbook distribution).
329. See Appendix infra at 382-85.
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tations on the effect of disclaimers. Many other courts, however, do so
more covertly by stretching the boundaries of conventional contract de-
fenses. This practice creates a significant gap between theory and prac-
tice in the law of handbook disclaimers.
This article proposes to bridge this gap by revising the theoretical
standard for handbook analysis. The essential point is this: a disclaimer
should not automatically defeat handbook enforcement without regard
for the overall tenor of the document. Instead, a disclaimer, along with
other handbook statements, should be tested with reference to the policy
concerns underlying handbook enforcement. Thus, with or without a
disclaimer, a handbook should be enforced if it conveys a credible prom-
ise of job security that the employees reasonably expect the employer to
honor, thereby fostering a favorable work environment that benefits the
employer.
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APPENDIX
Reported Decisions Declining to Recognize Handbook or Job Application
Disclaimers as Dispositive in Wrongful Discharge Cases (1980-1991)
Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1198, 1201-02 (5th Cir.)
(finding that employer's regulations and practices obviated application of
at-will doctrine despite disclaimer), reh'g denied, 826 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1987).
Allabashi v. Lincoln Nat'l Sales Corp., 824 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Colo. Ct. App.
1991) (reserving for trier of fact question of whether documents specify-
ing termination procedures affected at-will relationship notwithstanding
disclaimer in employment manual).
Badgett v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. 322, 324 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that annual employment agreements and provi-
sions of personnel manual supported finding of one-year contract provid-
ing for termination for just cause only, despite disclaimer stating that the
annual agreements were no "guarantees of employment").
Bratton v. Menard, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(finding question of whether employment handbook modified at-will em-
ployment relationship despite disclaimer was an issue of fact).
Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805, 809-10 (D. Colo.
1983) (holding that employer's manual granting displacement rights to
employees applied despite employment application clause stating that
employment was at will).
Brookshaw v. South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (stating that the trier of fact must determine whether em-
ployment manual modified at-will status of employee despite provision
stating that policies in the manual were to be applied solely at the discre-
tion of management).
Butzer v. Camelot Hall Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 454 N.W.2d 122, 124
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that issue of whether employee justifiably
expected that she would be terminated only for just cause, notwithstand-
ing provision in job application stating employment was at will, was a
question of fact).
Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 765 P.2d 619, 623 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988) (finding question of whether employment contract included
just-cause provisions of employment manual despite inclusion of dis-
claimer was a factual one).
Dalton v. Herbruck Egg Sales Corp., 417 N.W.2d 496, 498 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1987) (issue of fact whether, despite disclaimer, provisions in hand-
book modified at-will relationship).
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Davis v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1273, 1278-80
(M.D. Tenn. 1990) (trier of fact must determine whether employment
handbook affected at-will relationship notwithstanding disclaimer).
Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d 666, 668-69 (Wis. 1985) (just-cause
provisions of handbook could be found to have been part of employment
contract despite provision in job application stating that employment was
at will).
Harvet v. Unity Medical Ctr., Inc., 428 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (reservation clause in employment handbook not sufficiently
clear in its intent to preclude finding that the handbook's procedural pro-
tections became part of the employment contract).
Haselig v. Public Storage, Inc., 585 A.2d 294, 300-01 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991) (issue of fact whether procedural protections found in the
employment handbook modified at-will relationship despite disclaimer).
Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765, 775 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (as-
surances of severance pay negated effect of reservation clause found in
the employment handbook).
Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 690 F. Supp. 977, 979-80 (D.
Wyo. 1988) (disclaimer not clear and conspicuous enough to prevent
finding as matter of law that employer's manual of standard operating
procedures became part of the employment contract).
Johnson v. Nasca, 802 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (issue of
fact whether disciplinary procedures included in handbook could be
found to be part of the employment contract despite disclaimer).
Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 787-88 (Alaska
1989) (one sentence disclaimer insufficient in 85 page handbook).
Loffa v. Intel Corp., 738 P.2d 1146, 1151-52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (dis-
claimer not sufficiently clear and conspicuous to justify construing the
employment contract as a matter of law).
McLain v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 256 Cal. Rptr. 863, 867-69 (Ct. App.
1989) (parol evidence of employment agreement could be considered
where written disclaimer was standardized, incomplete, and not
integrated).
McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 870 (Wyo.
1990), remanded, 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991) (trial court must resolve
whether handbook affected at-will relationship notwithstanding
disclaimer).
McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 791 P.2d 452, 456-57 (N.M. 1990) (dis-
claimer does not automatically negate document's contractual status in
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light of uniform and consistent actions reflecting adherence to written
policies).
Montgomery v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 741 F. Supp. 1313, 1315-17
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (uncommunicated disclaimer is no disclaimer at all).
Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479, 481 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(disclaimer silent on whether employer needs good cause for
termination).
Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 849 (Kan. 1987) (disclaimer not
determinative as a matter of law in absence of showing that it was
brought to employee's attention or that it created an unqualified at-will
relationship).
Perman v. Arcventures, Inc., 554 N.E.2d 982 (In. App. Ct. 1990) (une-
quivocal manual language created enforceable contractual rights).
Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, Ltd., 555 A.2d 12, 14 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989) (disclaimer ineffective where employment-at-will
policy not stated in straightforward terms).
Rodie v. Max Factor & Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1989) (denial
of modification of at-will contract can constitute bad faith).
Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 409 N.W.2d 87, 89 (N.D. 1987)
(where parties' intent unclear in handbook alone, triable issue of material
fact exists).
Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 302 N.W.2d 307, 310-11 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981) (oral promises may not negate effect of disclaimers).
Seehawer v. Magnecraft Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 910, 914-15 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (clarification of ambiguous contract provisions best left to trier of
fact).
Seubert v. McKesson Corp., 273 Cal. Rptr. 296, 299-300 (Ct. App. 1990)
(evidence supported existence of implied contract requiring cause for
termination).
Stone v. Mission Bay Mortgage Co., 672 P.2d 629, 630 (Nev. 1983) (evi-
dence did not show as matter of law that at-will clause in job application
was intended to be a contract).
Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 781 P.2d 900, 903 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989)
(issue of fact exists concerning whether employee justifiably relied on
promises of specific treatment in specific situations).
Thompson v. King's Entertainment Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (E.D.
Va. 1987) (amended handbook disclaimer does not automatically become
effective upon issuance of the handbook).
Tiranno v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 472 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div. 1984)
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(interpreting handbook's disclaimer as requiring just cause prior to
termination).
Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231 (D.S.C. 1989) (mere revision of
handbook by adding a disclaimer could not terminate rights created by
prior handbook language).
Towns v. Emery Air Freight, Inc., 3 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 911,
914 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (denying summary judgment on grounds that im-
plied contract may exist despite employer's disclaimer).
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1038 (Ariz.
1985) (employer's announced policy is only one of several factors rele-
vant in determining whether a particular policy was intended by the par-
ties to modify an at-will agreement).
Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 185, 191 (Ct. App. 1989)
(employee handbook disclaimer only a factor to be considered by the jury
in determining existence and content of the employment contract), modi-
fied, 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. 1217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
Wojcik v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 732 F. Supp. 940, 942 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (handbook provisions promising employee appropriate notice
before termination of his job preclude granting of summary judgment
motion based on inclusion of disclaimer in handbook).
Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1476 (10th Cir. 1988) (contrac-
tual disclaimer not sufficient to justify summary judgment on a breach of
contract claim).
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